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ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE
DENIAL OF HEALTH CARE TO DREAMERS
FATMA MAROUF*
ABSTRACT

In the Affordable Care Act ("ACA "), passed in 2010, Congress
provided that only "lawfully present" individuals could obtain
insurance through the Marketplaces established under the Act.
Congress left it to the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS') to define who is "lawfully present." Initially, HHS
included all individuals with deferred action status, which is an
authorized period of stay but not a legal status. After President
Obama announced a new policy of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals ("DACA ") in June 2012, however, HHS amended its
regulation specifically to exclude DACA recipients from the
definition of "lawfully present." The revised regulation denied
DREAMers undocumented immigrants brought to the United
States as children access to affordable health care, while
providing it to similarly situated individuals who had been granted
deferred action through other means. This Article examines whether
the exclusion of DREAMers from the ACA violates equal protection
principles, highlighting critical inconsistencies and gaps in the case
law on standards of review for alienage classifications. A circuit
split exists about whether non-legal permanent residents are ever
entitled to strict scrutiny, and the extent of the Executive's power
over immigration remains unclear, as does the allocation of power
within the executive branch. In addition, courts are divided about
the standardof review that applies when states discriminateagainst
noncitizens pursuant to a federal statute. All of these issues
complicate the analysis and underscore the need to reevaluate an
unraveling tiered approachto judicialreview.
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INTRODUCTION

The application of equal protection principles to noncitizens remains
one of the most perplexing areas of constitutional law. While courts have
tried to articulate various principles to synthesize the case law in this area,
inconsistencies and uncertainties remain pervasive. As one federal
appellate court judge recently recognized, "What is remarkable is that
seventy-five years after United States v. Carolene Products Co. announced
the need for 'more exacting judicial scrutiny' for 'discrete and insular
minorities,' . . . we should be divided
over the proper standardof review
1
alienage."
on
based
for classifications
The general rule of thumb is that alienage-based classifications receive
strict scrutiny when made by states, since alienage, like race, is a suspect
classification, but rational basis review applies when such classifications
are made by the federal government, due to its plenary power over
immigration. The problem is that this approach is plagued with unresolved
questions. In terms of discrimination by states, a circuit split exists about
whether strict scrutiny applies only to legal permanent residents ("LPRs")
or extends to noncitizens with other types of status, such as individuals
with temporary work visas, asylum, withholding of removal, or parole. 2 In
addition, courts are divided about what to do with "hybrid" statutes, where
Congress gives states discretion to decide whether or not to discriminate
against certain categories of noncitizens. Some courts have held that states
have no real option to discriminate in this situation, while others have
upheld discriminatory actions by states on the basis that they are following
a federal direction.
Just as complicated are questions involving discrimination against
noncitizens by the federal government. While the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that Congress and the President have plenary power over
immigration, the allocation of power between the legislative and executive
branches remains unclear. The lawsuit brought by twenty-six states
challenging President Obama's executive actions on immigration
highlights this issue. Even more confusing-and less theorized-is the
scope of the plenary power within the executive branch. The Supreme
Court has issued only one, opaque decision addressing alienage-based
classifications by an executive agency that does not have direct

1. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
2. See infra Part ILA.2.
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responsibility over immigration. In that case, the Court found the
agency's classification unconstitutional but applied a due process analysis
to address an equal protection issue. 4 Consequently, there is still an open
question about what standard of scrutiny applies to alienage-based
classifications by federal agencies whose expertise is not immigration.
An issue that calls attention to these gaps and tensions in equal
protection jurisprudence is the exclusion of DREAMers from the
Affordable Care Act ("ACA" or "Act"). The term "DREAMers" is used to
describe undocumented individuals who came to the United States as
children, went to school here, and consider themselves American. They
are the group that would have benefited from the Development, Relief,
and Education for Alien Minors ("DREAM") Act, legislation that
Congress has introduced several times since 2001 but never passed into
law. 5 They are also the group that has benefited from the policy of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA"), introduced by the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") in 2012, which has
requirements resembling the DREAM Act, as it requires entering the
United States before the age of sixteen, living here continuously for at
least five years, satisfying certain educational requirements, and passing
criminal background checks. Unlike the DREAM Act, however, DACA
does not create a path to permanent residency or citizenship; it simply
allows qualifying individuals to apply for deferred action.
Deferred action is a temporary period of authorized stay granted by
DHS that allows someone to apply for employment authorization but does
not confer a legal status. As DHS has explained, "Deferred action is a
long-standing administrative mechanism dating back decades, by which
the Secretary of Homeland Security may defer the removal of an
undocumented immigrant for a period of time. ' 6 It is "a form of
prosecutorial discretion by which the Secretary deprioritizes an
individual's case for humanitarian reasons, administrative convenience, or

3. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
4. Id. at99-117.
5. See American Dream Act, H.R. 1751, 11 th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); American Dream Act,
H.R. 1275, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); DREAM Act of 2005, S. 2075, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005);
DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); DREAM Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (1st Sess.
2001).
6. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to Leon Rodriguez, Dir.,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. et al. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.aila.org/
infonet/dhs-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion [hereinafter Memorandum on Expanded DACA and
DAPA].
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in the interest of the Department's overall enforcement mission." 7 For
example, DHS typically grants deferred action status to certain classes of
individuals, including, but not limited to: abused spouses and children of
US citizens and permanent residents with approved self-petitions;
immediate relatives of certain US citizens killed in combat; victims of
crimes who have demonstrated prima facie eligibility
for U or T visas; and
S 8
important witnesses in investigations or prosecutions. In addition to such
classes, DHS has discretion to grant deferred action
in any removal case
S• 9
where the individual is a low enforcement priority. Even noncitizens who
have already been ordered deported may be granted deferred action based
on sympathetic facts if their removal is not a priority. DACA therefore
represents just one of many ways to be granted deferred action.
The key question for purposes of access to affordable health care is
whether individuals granted deferred action through DACA should be
considered "lawfully present" in the United States. The ACA explicitly
limits access to its health insurance Marketplaces and tax credits to
10
individuals who are "lawfully present" but does not define this term.
Instead, Congress left it to the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to define who is "lawfully present." 11 Initially, in 2010, HHS

7. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016) (describing deferred action as "an act of
administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority").
8. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS 4 (2011) (discussing deferred action
status for important witnesses) [hereinafter TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS]; Battered Spouse, Children
& Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/batteredspouse-children-parents (last visited May 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/EHE9-YCKB ("If
your Form 1-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant is approved and you do not
have legal immigration status in the United States, we may place you in deferred action, which allows
you to remain in the United States."); Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitaian/victims-human-traffickingother- crimes/victims- criminal- activity-u- nonimmigrant- status/victims- criminal-activity-u- nonimmigra
nt-status (last visited May 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/AYX4-7V56 ("Petitioners placed on
the waiting list will be granted deferred action or parole and are eligible to apply for work
authorization while waiting for additional U visas to become available."); Memorandum on Expanded
DACA and DAPA, supra note 6, at 2 nn.2-3.
9. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland
Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement et al. 2 (Nov.
20, 2014), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/publications/14 1120 memo prosecut
orial discretion.pdf (discussing the use of deferred action for cases that are low priorities); Karl R.
Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Op. for
the Sec'y of Homeland Sec. and the Counsel to the President 18-19 (Nov. 19, 2014), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prior
itize-removal.pdf (same); Memorandum on Expanded DACA and DAPA, supra note 6, at 2 (same);
TOOL KIT FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 8, at 4 (same).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2014).
11. Id. § 18081.
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included all individuals with deferred action status in its definition of
"lawfully present. ' 12 However, after President Obama announced DACA
in June 2012, HHS changed its interpretation to exclude DACA recipients
from the definition of "lawfully present," even though it continued to
include all other individuals with deferred action status. 13 HHS's decision
to treat some individuals with deferred action as "lawfully present" while
excluding others with the exact same status raises a serious equal
protection issue. Yet the standard of review that applies in this situation
remains unclear.
In determining the proper standard of review for the disparate treatment
of DACA recipients under the ACA, one must grapple with at least three
unresolved questions. First, there is an open question about whether
noncitizens with deferred action status are ever entitled to heightened
scrutiny. Second, although HHS is part of the federal government, it is an
agency that does not have direct responsibility over immigration, so there
is a question about whether it is entitled to deference under the plenary
power doctrine. Third, since states can choose whether to create their own
Marketplaces under the ACA, a question arises whether choosing to do so
involves engaging in prohibited discrimination, or whether such
discrimination is permitted because the states are merely following a
federal directive.
Part I of this Article provides background information about the
exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA, including the legislative
history that led to this exclusion and its far-reaching consequences for
DREAMers. Part II describes the overt discord and covert gaps in equal
protection cases involving noncitizens, examining the issues that plague
alienage-based classifications by both state and federal governments, as
well as the controversy surrounding Congressional delegation of the power
to discriminate to states. Part III then examines the relevance of these
questions to HHS's decision to exclude DACA recipients from the ACA,
exploring whether heightened scrutiny should apply in this situation and, if
not, whether the differential treatment of DREAMers would survive even
rational basis review. This Part also explores whether states that apply
HHS's discriminatory regulation through their own Marketplaces are
engaging in prohibited discrimination subject to strict scrutiny. Part IV
offers a path through this quagmire by making explicit what has already
occurred in practice: abandonment of a tiered approach to standards of

12. 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(vi) (2010).
13. 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(vi), (8) (2016).
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review. This Part suggests adopting a more flexible, sliding-scale
approach. Part IV also examines alternative modes of legal analysis as a
way to avoid the equal protection conundrum, such as administrative law
challenges to the exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA, but
contends that it is still essential to clarify how courts should review
alienage-based classifications.
Nearly eight hundred thousand individuals have been granted deferred
action through DACA thus far.14 In November 2014, DHS announced an
expansion of the DACA policy, as well as a new policy of Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
("DAPA").5 Together, these new policies could provide deferred action to
up to 5.2 million people. 16 The policies have not yet been implemented,
however, due to a lawsuit filed by twenty-six states that led to 17a
preliminary injunction putting them on hold until the case is resolved.
HHS has not yet passed any regulations regarding the treatment of
expanded DACA or DAPA recipients under the ACA, but it is expected to
18
exclude them, just like original DACA recipients, if the policies survive.
The disparate treatment of different groups of individuals with deferred
action is therefore a pressing issue that could affect millions of lives.

14. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NUMBER OF I821D, CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS BY FISCAL YEAR,
QUARTER, INTAKE, BIOMETRICS AND CASE STATUS: 2012-2016 (DECEMBER 31) (2016), available at
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-form-i-821d-deferred-acti
on-childhood-arrivals [hereinafter USCIS DATA SET].
15. See Memorandum on Expanded DACA and DAPA, supra note 6.
16. Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, All Eyes on U.S. Federal Courts as Deferred Action
Programs Halted, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/all-eyes-us-federal-courts-deferred-action-programs-halted, archived at https://perma.cc/C4YG-

KVK8.
17. See United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 23, 2016) (per curiam)
(affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision denying the federal government's appeal of the preliminary
injunction by an equally divided Court); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying
the federal govermnent's appeal of the preliminary injunction), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016);
Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying the federal government's motion to stay
or narrow the preliminary injunction); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(granting the preliminary injunction). Since the appeal to the Supreme Court involved only a
preliminary injunction, the Court may have an opportunity to revisit the case after a final judgment.
18. NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., DACA AND DAPA ACCESS TO FEDERAL HEALTH AND
ECONOMIC SUPPORT PROGRAMS 1 (2015).
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A. Legislative History
The Affordable Care Act became law in March 2010 after a highly
contentious and divisive political process. The purpose of the Act is to
increase the number of insured individuals and reduce the cost of health
care. Under prior rules, health insurance companies could deny insurance
based on a preexisting condition, charge more based on an applicant's
gender or location, and cancel an insurance policy once an individual
started using it. 19 The ACA prevents insurance companies from taking
these actions. In addition to creating a federal "Marketplace" (also called
an "Exchange") for consumers to purchase health insurance, the Act
allows states to create their own health insurance Marketplaces. There are
currently two types of state-based Marketplaces. In one kind, the state is
responsible for performing all of the Marketplace functions, including
receiving applications through its own website. In the other kind, which is
called a "federally-supported" state-based Marketplace, the state performs
all Marketplace functions, except that it relies on the federal government's
IT platform, so consumers apply for coverage through healthcare.gov.
Currently, twelve states and the District of Columbia have totally statebased Marketplaces, and four states have "federally-supported" state-based
Marketplaces. In addition, seven states have "state-partnership"
Marketplaces, where the state provides in-person consumer assistance, and
HHS performs all other marketplace functions. The remaining twentyseven states use the federal Marketplace, where HHS performs all
functions. 2 Only insurance companies that agree to follow the Act's rules
can sell insurance plans in these Marketplaces.
The Act also helps consumers pay for health insurance by providing
two types of tax credits that are based on household income. First, the Act
provides "premium tax credits" that help reduce the cost of health
insurance premiums. 2 Second, the Act provides "cost-sharing reductions"

19. See NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: EXCLUSION OF
YOUTH GRANTED "DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS" FROM AFFORDABLE HEALTH

CARE 2-3, 7-8 (2013), archived at https://perma.cc/9KP5-6LVX.
20. For a table showing which states use which types of Marketplaces, see State Health
Insurance Marketplace Types, 2016, HENRY FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/stateindicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/ (last visited May 13, 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/64K9-GWER.
21. I.R.C. § 36B (2014).
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that limit the cost of copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles. 22 These
tax credits are available to households with incomes at or below 400
percent of the federal poverty level that buy private
health insurance
23
through a Marketplace and file federal tax returns.
In order to be eligible for a health plan offered through a Marketplace
under the Act or to claim either of the tax credits, an individual must be "a
citizen or national of the United States or . . . lawfully present in the
United States. ' 24 Congress did not define "lawfully present" in the statute,
but instead left it to the Department of Health and Human Services to do
so as part of establishing a program that meets the requirements of the
Act. 25 One of the Act's key provisions is that it prohibits the denial of
health insurance or inflation of rates based on preexisting medical
conditions. 26 Since this provision did not become effective until January 1,
2014, § 1101 of the Act directed HHS to establish a temporary high-risk
health insurance program to provide immediate access to coverage for
eligible noninsured individuals with preexisting conditions. Eligibility
under this temporary program was similarly limited to2 7 US citizens,
nationals, and individuals "lawfully present" in the country.
On July 30, 2010, HHS issued an interim final regulation implementing
28
§ 1101 of the Act. This regulation provides that an individual is eligible
to enroll in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan ("PCIP") program if
he or she is "a citizen or national of the United States or lawfully present
in the United States. ' 29 HHS defined "lawfully present" in the interim
final regulation at 45 C.F.R. § 152.2. This definition included, among
30
many other categories, "[a]liens currently in deferred action status."
HHS subsequently passed regulations implementing the Affordable
Insurance Exchanges and premium tax credits that cross-referenced this
definition of "lawfully present. ' ,3 1 Furthermore, the same definition of

22. See 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2014).
23. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A); 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 155.305(f) (2016).
24. J.R.C. § 36B(e)(2) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18032(f)(3), 18071(e)(2) (emphasis
added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18082(d).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 18081.
26. Id. § 18001.
27. See id. § 18001(d).
28. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,014 (July 30, 2010) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152).
29. 45 C.F.R. § 152.14(a)(1) (2010).
30. Id. § 152.2(4)(vi).
31. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B1(g) (2012) (implementing the premium tax credits); 45 C.F.R.
§ 155.20 (2012) (implementing the Affordable Insurance Exchanges).
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"lawfully present" was used to define eligibility for Medicaid and the
Children's Health Insurance Program ("CHIP"), which provide free or
low-cost comprehensive health insurance for children under the age of
twenty-one, pregnant women, and certain32 low-income individuals,
including seniors and persons with disabilities.
Two years later, on June 15, 2012, President Obama announced a new
policy called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, which granted
deferred action status to undocumented immigrants who had entered the
United States as children, had lived here for at least five years, were below
the age of thirty-one on that date, complied with certain educational
requirements, and had not been convicted of certain crimes. A
Memorandum issued by the Secretary of DHS that set forth these criteria
described DACA as a form of prosecutorial discretion for young people
who "lacked the intent to violate the law. "'33 It explained that immigration
laws should not be "blindly enforced without consideration given to the
individual circumstances of each case" and were not "designed to remove
productive young people to countries where they may not have lived or
even speak the language."34 In addition, the Memorandum recognized that
"many of these young people have already contributed to our country in
significant ways.,35
Shortly thereafter, on August 30, 2012, HHS published an interim final
regulation that amended the definition
• • 36of "lawfully present" in 45 C.F.R.
§ 152.2 to exclude DACA recipients. While the revised regulation still
included the general category of individuals in deferred action status, it
carved out an exception specifically excluding individuals who had
obtained deferred action status through DACA. 37 This change made
DACA recipients ineligible for the PCIP, Affordable Insurance
Exchanges, premium tax credits, and cost-sharing reductions, since all of
these rely on the same definition of "lawfully present." 38 HHS explained

32. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Health
Official (July 1, 2010), available at https://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/SMDL/
downloads/SHO10006.pdf.
33. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting
Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection et al. 1 (June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl -exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us
-as-children.pdf.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
36. 45 C.F.R. § 152.2(4)(vi), (8) (2016).

37. Id.
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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that excluding DACA recipients from the PCIP would ensure that the
interim ",39
final rule "does not inadvertently expand the scope of the DACA
According to HHS, it "would not be consistent with the
process.
reasons offered for adopting the DACA process to extend health insurance
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act to these individuals." 40 HHS
described DHS's reason for adopting DACA as ensuring that enforcement
efforts focus on high-priority cases. 41
HHS's revised definition of "lawfully present" also excluded DACA
recipients from obtaining affordable health insurance under the state
option available in Medicaid and CHIP. 42 The Children's Health Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 ("CHIPRA") gives states the option
of providing Medicaid or CHIP to children and/or pregnant women who
are "lawfully residing" in the United States and otherwise meet the criteria
for these benefits. 43 The definition of "lawfully residing" tracks the
definition of "lawfully present," with the additional requirement that the
individual establish residence in the state where she is applying for
benefits. 44 Thus, by excluding DACA recipients from the definition of
"lawfully present," the interim final rule also excluded them from the
definition of "lawfully residing" for purposes of eligibility for Medicaid
and CHIP. Once again, the only explanation offered by HHS in the interim
final rule was that "the reasons that DHS offered for adopting the DACA
process do not pertain to eligibility for Medicaid or CHIP.'
HHS stated
this same reason in a letter issued to State Health Officials and Medicaid
Directors on August 28, 2012.46
HHS made the amended interim final rule effective immediately,
invoking a waiver of the usual notice and comment procedures for
proposed rulemaking. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
provides an exception to notice and comment procedures where the agency

39. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,614, 52,615 (Aug. 30,
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(4)(A), 1397aa(a) (2014).
44. See Letter from Cindy Mann, supra note 32, at 2. The regulations specify that residence
means living in a state with the intent to remain there for an indefinite period. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.403
(2016).
45. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,614, 52,615 (Aug. 30,
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152).
46. Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Services, to State Health Official
and Medicaid Director 1 (Aug. 28, 2012), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-PolicyGuidance/Downloads/SHO- 12-002.pdf.
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finds good cause that those procedures would be impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. 4 7 Here, HHS found that
waiting for public comments to issue the regulation would be contrary to
the public interest because the PCIP program was enrolling eligible
individuals, and HHS thought it important to "provide clarity with respect
to eligibility for this new and unforeseen group of individuals as soon as
possible, before anyone with deferred action under the DACA process
applies to enroll in the PCIP program." 48 Based on the same rationale,
HHS applied the good cause exception to waiting at least thirty days after
49
publication in the Federal Register for a final rule to become effective
50
and made the final rule effective immediately.
Although the regulation excluding DACA recipients was made
effective immediately, HHS provided sixty days for public comments "on
the implications of the amendment." 5 1 In response, HHS received over
250 comments from legal organizations, health care providers, nonprofits
that work with immigrants, and others, which overwhelmingly opposed
the change. 5 2 The main reasons given for opposition were that the
exclusion of DACA recipients contradicted the purpose of the ACA,
would lead to higher health insurance premiums for everyone, would
increase health care costs, would send mixed messages to lawfully present
immigrants, and would make arbitrary distinctions among individuals with
the same legal status. 53 Furthermore, at least one commentator, the

47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2014).
48. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 52,616.
49. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3).
50. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. at 52,616.
51. See id.
52. See REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!searchResults;rpp=50;po=0;s=CMS%
25E2%2580%25939995%25E2%2580%25931FC2;dct=PS (last visited May 13, 2016).

53. See, e.g., id.; Asian Am. Justice Ctr., Comments on CMS' Interim Final Rule Changes to
Definition of "Lawfully Present" in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program of the
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0132; Alison Buist & Kathleen King, Children's Def. Fund,
Comments on CMS' Interim Final Rule Changes to Definition of "Lawfully Present" in the PreExisting Condition Insurance Plan Program of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 29, 2012),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0118; Matt Ginsburg,
AFL-CIO, Comments on Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52614 (Oct.
29, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0170;

Robin Goldfaden, Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Comments on
Changes by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services,

to Interim Final Rule Definition of "Lawfully Present" in the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan
Program of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 29, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0209; Jennifer Ng'andu & Laura Vazquez, Nat'l Council of La
Raza, Comments on CMS' Interim Final Rule Changes to Definition of "Lawfully Present" in the Pre-
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Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, challenged HHS's
reliance on the good cause exceptions to circumvent regular notice and
comment procedures and make the regulation effective immediately. 54 In
December 2012, Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), joined by eighty
members of Congress, sent a letter to President
Obama asking him to
55
recipients.
DACA
for
care
reinstate health
These calls for reform have not been successful. In fact, the Obama
administration has taken pains to ensure that excluded categories of
immigrants do not obtain insurance coverage under the Act. In September
2014, the administration announced that it had cut off the ACA coverage
of about 115,000 immigrants who had failed to provide proof that they
were lawfully present in the country. 56 Furthermore, in November 2014,
when President Obama expanded the category of individuals eligible for
DACA and created Deferred Action for undocumented immigrants who
are the parents of US citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents, media
reports indicated that these individuals would also be excluded from
coverage under the ACA. 57 As discussed below, these exclusions leave
hundreds of thousands-and potentially millions-of individuals who are
lawfully living and working in the United States without any health
insurance.
B. Impact of DACA and DAPA Policies
To date, nearly 1.4 million individuals eligible for the original DACA
program have applied. 58 Approximately 1.2 million of these applications

Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Oct. 29, 2012),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0203.
54. James A. Ferg-Cadima, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund (Oct. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2012-0138-0242.
55. Press Release, Rep. Barbara Lee, Letter to Obama: Reinstate Healthcare to DREAMers (Dec.
18, 2012), available at https://lee.house.gov/news/press-releases/letter-to-obama-reinstate-healthcareto-dreamers.
56. Lena H. Sun, 115,000 Immigrants to Lose Health Coverage by Sept. 30 Because of Lack of
Status Data, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/i 15000-immigrants-to-lose-health-coverage-by-sept-30-because-of-lack-of-status-data/2014/0
9/15/f76be8e6-3dl 8-1 le4-9587-5dafd96295f0 story.html.
57. See Jason Millman & Juliet Eilperin, Obama's Order Won't Extend Obamacare to
Undocumented Immigrants, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/11/19/obamas-order-wont-extend-obamacare-to-undocumented-immigrants/;
Michael
D. Shear & Robert Pear, Obama'sImmigration Plan CouldShield Five Million, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19,

2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/us/politics/obamacare-unlikely-for-undocumented-immig
rants.html? r=0.
58. USCIS DATA SET, supra note 14.
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have been approved, and about sixty thousand remain pending. 59 Many
recipients are now filing their renewal applications, since DACA began in
2012 and granted deferred action status for a period of two years. By the
end of Fiscal Year 2015, US Citizenship and Immigration
Services
S • 60
("USCIS") had received nearly 400,000 renewal applications. As a
population, those who have applied for DACA are quite young and have
strong ties to the United States. One-third of the applicants were between
the ages of fifteen and eighteen, and another forty percent were between
the ages of nineteen and twenty-three. 6 1 Furthermore, nearly three-quarters
of the applicants have lived in the United States for at least ten years, and
one-third arrived at age five or younger.62
In November 2014, the Department of Homeland Security announced
an expanded DACA program, as well as a new program called Deferred
Action for Parental Accountability. 63 If implemented, the expanded
DACA program would make about 330,000 additional immigrants eligible
for deferred action status by eliminating the requirement that applicants be
under the age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012, and requiring continuous
residence in the United States since January 1, 2010, instead of June 15,
2007. 64 About one hundred thousand more people may become eligible for
DACA over time by turning fifteen, which is the minimum age to apply,
or by satisfying the education requirement (i.e., by enrolling in school or
obtaining a high school diploma or GED). 65 In addition, an estimated 3.7
million immigrants would qualify for DAPA. 66 This figure includes 3.53
million parents of US citizens and 180,000 parents of legal permanent
residents. 67 Together, the expanded DACA and DAPA programs could

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Audrey Singer & Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Immigration Facts: Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
reports/2013/08/14-daca-immigration-singer, archived at https://perma.cc[UR3J-Z8MQ.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
64. See Jens Manual Krogstad & Ana Gonzales-Barrera, If Original DACA ProgramIs a Guide,
Many Eligible Immigrants Will Apply for Deportation Relief, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/05/if-original-daca-program-is-a-guide-many-eligibleimmigrants-will-apply-for-deportation-relief/, archived at https://perma.cc/BET5-LT7F; see also Press
Release, Migration Policy Inst., As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief
from Deportation Under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program (Nov. 19, 2014), available at
http://migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-get-relief-depor
tation-under-anticipated-new [hereinafter Migration Policy Institute Press Release].
65. See Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 16.
66. Migration Policy Institute Press Release, supra note 64.
67. Id.
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allow 5.2 million undocumented immigrants-half of the estimated
undocumented population-to live and work lawfully in the United States.
Although the process of applying for deferred action under the
expanded DACA program was expected to begin on February 18, 2015, a
preliminary injunction issued by a federal district court judge in Texas and
upheld by the Fifth Circuit has put the process on hold. The preliminary
injunction is based on a lawsuit filed by twenty-six states challenging the
DACA and DAPA programs as unlawful under the US Constitution's
Take Care Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. 68 In June 2016,
an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision in
a one-sentence per curiam decision. 69 The fate of these recent programs
remains uncertain, since the appeal concerned only a preliminary
injunction, and a final judgment in the case-which may ultimately be
reviewed by a full complement of Justices-has not yet been issued.
Regardless of what happens with the expanded DACA and DAPA
programs, however, there has been no legal challenge to the original
DACA program. Thus, regardless of the outcome of the recent lawsuit, the
exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA remains an important
concern. Of course, if an appellate court upholds the expanded DACA and
DAPA programs, then over five million people will be authorized to live
and work in the United States but excluded from affordable health care
under the ACA.
C. Health Care Optionsfor DACA Recipients
In order to assess the impact of exclusion from the ACA, it is important
to understand what other health care options are available to DACA
recipients. One option is to obtain health insurance through an employer.
Nothing prevents DACA recipients from obtaining health insurance in this
way, since they can receive an employment authorization document that
enables them to obtain a valid social security number. A significant
fraction of DACA recipients, however, will not have access to employerbased health insurance, given the statistics for their age group and
individuals of Hispanic race.7 0 Even DACA recipients who are lucky

68. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
69. United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 23, 2016) (per curiam).
70. Young people in the age group of most DACA recipients (fifteen to twenty-five) are less
likely to be engaged in employment that offers health insurance. According to 2010 census data, fortythree percent of individuals aged fifteen to eighteen and sixty percent of those aged nineteen to twentyfive were offered health insurance by an employer, compared to three-quarters of individuals aged
twenty-six

to

sixty-four.

HUBERT

JANICKI, U.S.
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enough to have employment-based insurance now may become uninsured
in the future,
as the availability of employer-based health insurance
71
declines.
Another option for those excluded from the ACA is to rely on the socalled "safety net" of health care providers, which includes a patchwork of
public hospitals, community health centers, local health departments, rural
clinics, special service providers, and private physicians who provide
charity care. 7 2 There are several reasons why these safety net providers are
unlikely to be able to meet the health needs of those excluded from the
73
ACA. First, safety-net providers remain under enormous financial strain.
Many states faced with budget deficits have cut spending onS Medicaid,
74
which is the primary source of funding for safety-net providers. At the
same time, the demand for safety-net services has increased significantly
over the past decade. 75 In76addition, huge geographical variations exist in
the strength of safety nets.

HEALTH INSURANCE: 2010: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES 2 (2013).
Furthermore, census data indicate that only fifty-six percent of Hispanics were offered insurance
through an employer in 2010, compared to about three-quarters of Whites and Blacks. Id. at 6. Among
those offered employer-based insurance, many do not enroll because they cannot afford it. Id. at 13.
While Hispanics constitute nineteen percent of the population, they represent thirty-four percent of the
EMPLOYMENT-BASED

uninsured. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 5, 2015),

http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/, archived at https://perma
.cc/K6TH-HPGU. Among Hispanic noncitizens, half are uninsured. Jens Manuel Krogstad & Mark
Hugo Lopez, Hispanic Immigrants More Likely to Lack Health Insurance Than U.S. -Born, PEW

RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/26/higher-share-ofhispanic-immigrants-than-u-s-born-lack-health-insurance/, archived at https://perma.cc!T29F-38AC.
71.

See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Envisioning the End of Employer-Provided Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES

(May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/upshot/employer-sponsored-health-insurancemay-be-on-the-way-out.html? r=0. One study predicts that by 2020, the overwhelming majority of
workers who now receive health insurance through their employers will move to insurance obtained
through ACA Marketplaces. See S&P CAPITAL IQ, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT COULD SHIFT
HEALTH CARE BENEFIT RESPONSIBILITY AWAY FROM EMPLOYERS, POTENTIALLY SAVING S&P 500

COMPANIES $700 BILLION 8 (2014).

72. The Institute of Medicine has defined the safety net as health care providers that have a legal
mandate or mission of providing health care to patients regardless of their ability to pay and that treat a
substantial share of patients who are uninsured, on Medicaid, or otherwise vulnerable. INST. OF MED.,
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED 1 (2000).
73. See Irwin Redlener & Roy Grant, America's Safety Net and Health CareReform

Ahead?, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2201, 2202 (2009).
74. ACAD. HEALTH, THE IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
(2011).

What Lies

ACT ON THE SAFETY NET

2-3

75. Id.

76. INST. OF MED., supra note 72, at 2. Sixty-five million people live in federally designated
Health Professional Shortage Areas, many of which have no health center whatsoever; and those that
do have health centers may provide only limited services. Redlener & Grant, supra note 73, at 2202.
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The ACA will make health insurance available to some groups that
previously relied on safety-net providers.7 7 Yet an estimated 23 million
people will remain uninsured, either because they are excluded from the
mandate or because they decide to pay a penalty instead of purchasing
insurance.7 8 Safety-net providers are concerned about their ability to treat
this large uninsured population, in part because they are losing funding
through the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital ("DSH") program,
which began being phased out in 2014.79 Safety-net providers worry that
'[t]hey may lose more in DSH payments than they will gain in other
revenue.
In addition, patients may turn to safety-net
providers for
81
services that are not covered by their insurance plans.
Finally, DACA recipients excluded from the ACA could potentially
obtain care in emergency rooms. Under the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Labor Act ("EMTALA"), hospitals are required to provide emergency
care regardless of immigration status or ability to pay. 82 However,
emergency care in this country remains in a dismal state. For the past

twenty years, the rate of emergency room visits has increased at twice the
rate of growth of the US population. 83 In 2014, the American College of
Emergency Physicians ("ACEP") gave a grade of "D+" to the overall
environment in which the emergency care system operates. 84 ACEP
reports that this near-failing grade "reflects trouble for a nation that has too
few emergency departments to meet the needs of a growing, aging
population, and of the increasing
number of people now insured as a result
' 85
Act."
Care
Affordable
of the

77. For example, the expansion of the Medicaid program to cover individuals with income up to
133 percent of the federal poverty level will create a payment source for patients who were previously
uninsured. Other formerly uninsured patients will be able to purchase insurance through the premium
and cost-sharing subsidies that are now available to families with incomes between 100 and 400
percent of the federal poverty level. These individuals may no longer need to use safety-net providers,
or they may be able to pay safety-net providers through their new insurance. See ACAD. HEALTH,
supra note 74, at 3.
78. Id. at 4. In 2015, uninsured individuals were expected to represent twenty-two percent of
health center patients. Id.
79. Id. This program gives money to states to subsidize certain hospitals that incur unreimbursed
costs related to treating uninsured and Medicaid patients. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 4-5. In particular, safety-net providers fear that increased demand for specialty
services, such as mental health care, will strain their capacity. Id. at 5.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2014).
83. AM. COLL. OF EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, AMERICA'S EMERGENCY CARE ENVIRONMENT: A
STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD, at v (2014) [hereinafter ACEP STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD].
84. Id.
85.

Id.

1288

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

93:1271

Although one of the selling points of the ACA was its potential to
reduce emergency room visits, the opposite has actually happened. A 2014
survey shows that nearly half of emergency room physicians reported an
increase in the number of patients since the ACA went into effect, and the
vast majorit (86 percent) expected the number to increase over the next
three years. One reason for this increase is that the millions of people
who became eligible for Medicaid under the ACA cannot find physicians
who will accept their insurance and therefore go to the emergency room
for treatment instead. 87 Most emergency room physicians do not think
their departments are equipped to handle this increase, and only one-third
believe the ACA will have a positive long-term impact on access to
88
emergency care.
The obstacles to accessing both employment-based health insurance
and safety-net providers, including emergency rooms, suggest that a
substantial portion of DACA recipients will be unable to access any kind
of affordable health care if kept out of the insurance programs under the
ACA. Determining whether their exclusion from the ACA comports with
the Equal Protection Clause is therefore a pressing legal issue.
II.

SCRUTNIZING STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR ALIENAGE
CLASSIFICATIONS

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 9 In 1886, the Supreme Court held that this
provision applies "to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." 90 Nearly
seventy years later, on the same day that it decided Brown v. Board of
Education, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to the
federal government through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
since "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government. ' 9 1 In the immigration context,

86. MKTG. GEN., INc., 2014 ACEP POLLING SURVEY RESULTS 6, 9 (2014) [hereinafter ACEP
POLLING SURVEY RESULTS].

87. ACEP STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD, supra note 83, at 1-2.
88. ACEP POLLING SURVEY RESULTS, supra note 86, at 10.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (invalidating San Francisco's denial of
permits to Chinese laundry operators).
91. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that racial discrimination in District of
Columbia public schools violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also Brown v.
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however, the Court has held that the Constitution does impose a lesser
duty on the federal government. 92 While alienage-based classifications by
states are generally subject to strict scrutiny, federal classifications usually
receive only rational basis review. 93 The deference given to the federal
government stems from the plenary power doctrine, which ties the federal
immigration power to foreign94affairs and national security, issues largely
immune from judicial review.
With respect to both state and federal classifications, however,
significant questions that bear on the appropriate standard of review
remain unanswered to this day. Regarding state classifications, there is
currently a circuit split about whether strict scrutiny is limited to legal
permanent residents ("LPRs") or extends to others who are lawfully
present. With respect to federal classifications, the division of immigration
authority between Congress and the President remains unclear, as
evidenced by the pending litigation challenging the legality of the DACA
and DAPA policies. Furthermore, the allocation of immigration authority
within the executive branch has remained largely unexamined by courts
and scholars alike, yet is highly relevant to assessing alienage-based
classifications made by executive agencies. Another layer of complexity
emerges when federal and state programs are entangled; courts have sliced
this type of "Gordian knot" in conflicting ways.95 These lacunae in the
legal landscape of alienage-based classifications are all relevant to
analyzing whether the exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA

Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
92. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85-86 (1976) (applying rational basis review to welfare rules
that treated legal permanent residents and citizens differently).
93. Compare Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85-86 (applying rational basis review to federal welfare rules
that treated legal permanent residents and citizens differently), with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 375-76 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to state welfare rules that treated legal permanent
residents and citizens differently). There is an exception to the general rule that state-made
classifications receive strict scrutiny when a state excludes noncitizens from participation in its
democratic political institutions. In that situation, only rational basis review applies. See Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) ("The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes
is .. . a necessary consequence of the community's process of political self-definition."); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1979) ("[S]ome state functions are so bound up with the operation of
the State as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons who
have not become part of the process of self-government.'); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648
(1973) (recognizing "a State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic
political institutions").
94. See infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
95. Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 66 (2014) ("[T]his case presents a Gordian knot of federal
and state legislation effecting an adverse impact on resident aliens ....
").
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violates equal protection. This Part therefore addresses each of them in
turn.
A. Discriminationby States
1. Strict Scrutinyfor Legal PermanentResidents

Since the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Graham v. Richardson,
alienage-based classifications made by states are normally subject to strict
scrutiny, which requires showing that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling government interest. 96 In Graham, the Court
examined two state statutes that denied welfare benefits to LPRs. 97 One
statute made permanent residents ineligible for these benefits, while the
98
other imposed a fifteen-year residency requirement for them to qualify.
For the first time, the Court found that "classifications based on alienage,
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject

to close judicial scrutiny," as "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a
'discrete and insular' •.,99
minority for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate."
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court struck
down both statutes as violations of the Equal Protection Clause, explaining

that "a State's desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own
1
citizens is inadequate to justify ... making noncitizens ineligible." 00
Since Graham, the Court has repeatedly found that state laws treating
citizens and noncitizens
differently violate equal protection under strict
10 1
review.
scrutiny

96. Graham, 403 U.S. at 375-76; see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,
413, 420, 422 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a California statute that targeted individuals of
Japanese descent by barring issuance of fishing licenses to persons "ineligible to citizenship" and
explaining that "the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is
confined within narrow limits").
97. Graham, 403 U.S. at 366468.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938)).
100. Id. at 374.
101. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 217-18 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to
invalidate a Texas statute that required notaries public to be US citizens); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs,
Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny to state
restrictions on civil engineering licenses); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 717-29 (1973) (applying strict
scrutiny to invalidate a Connecticut statute excluding aliens from being licensed as attorneys);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (holding that the state's exclusion of aliens from civil
service jobs denied them equal protection); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2012)
(applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a New York statute that prohibited nonimmigrants with
temporary work visas from obtaining a pharmacist's license).
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State statutes that discriminate among noncitizens likewise are
considered classifications based on alienage and subject to strict
scrutiny. 10 2 In Nyquist v. Mauclet, the Supreme Court considered a New
York statute that imposed alienage-based restrictions on eligibility for
state financial assistance for higher education.l°3 To qualify, a student had
to be a US citizen, an LPR with a pending application for citizenship, an
LPR who was not yet qualified to apply for citizenship but who pledged to
apply as soon as possible, or someone paroled into the United States as a
refugee. 104 The statute was challenged on equal protection grounds by two
LPRs who did not wish to become US citizens. 105 In defending the
constitutionality of the statute, the state argued that "the statute
distinguishe[d] only within the heterogeneous class of aliens and [did] not
distinguish between citizens and aliens vel non." 106 According to the state,
"[o]nly statutory classifications of the latter type ... warrant strict
,,107
scrutiny. '
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the Arizona
statute at issue in Graham "served to discriminate only within the class of
aliens: Aliens who met the durational residency requirement were entitled
to welfare benefits." 10 8 In Nyquist, the Court stressed that "[t]he important
points are that [the statute] is directed at aliens and that only aliens are
harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean
that it does not discriminate against the class." 109 Since both of the
appellees in the case were LPRs, the Court did not specifically address the
issue of whether a state statute that harmed only non-LPRs would be
constitutional.

102. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a New
York statute that limited financial aid for higher education to citizens, those who had applied for
citizenship, and those who declared an intent to apply when they became eligible); Graham, 403 U.S.
at 371-74 (applying strict scrutiny to an Arizona statute that required fifteen years of residence in the
United States for noncitizens to qualify for benefits but had no residency requirement for US citizens).
103. Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 2-4.

104. Id. at 3-4.
105. Id. at4-6.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
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Nor has the Supreme Court addressed this issue in any subsequent
cases. While the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the standard
of review for state laws that discriminate against individuals who have
only temporary visas (as opposed to permanent residency) in Toll v.
Moreno, it declined to do so. There, the Court was asked to decide the
constitutionality of a Maryland law that denied in-state tuition to
individuals with G-4 visas, which are issued to the immediate family
members of employees of international organizations. 1 1 The Court
invalidated the law as preempted by Congress's detailed scheme for G-4
visa holders and therefore did not consider the equal protection issue. 112
Consequently, although the Supreme Court has not distinguished
among categories of lawfully present noncitizens in applying strict
scrutiny to state laws, a circuit split has emerged on what standard of
review applies to non-LPRs.
2. CircuitSplitfor Non-Legal PermanentResidents
The only distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in standards of
scrutiny has been between individuals who are lawfully present and those
who are undocumented. While the Court has applied strict scrutiny to the
former, it indicated that rational basis review applies to the latter in Plyler
v. Doe, which involved a Texas statute that prohibited undocumented
children from attending public schools. 113 In Plyler, the Court found that
undocumented children did not constitute a suspect class, reasoning that
they fell outside of Graham'sreach because "their presence in this country
in violation of federal law is not a 'constitutional irrelevancy."' 114

110. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). This case was decided the same month as Plyler v. Doe, a
seminal decision striking down as unconstitutional a Texas statute that prohibited undocumented
children from attending school. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
111. Toll,458U.S.at3.
112. Id. at 17. Some commentators have suggested that the occupational licensing cases discussed
above should also have been resolved through the preemption doctrine, since the federal immigration
statute and regulations include relevant language about work authorization and licensing. See Jennesa
Calvo-Friedman, Note, The Uncertain Terrain of State Occupational Licensing Laws for Noncitizens:
A Preemption Analysis, 102 GEo. L.J. 1597, 1621-22 (2014) (arguing that state laws barring
nonimmigrants from certain licensed occupations undermine 8 U.S.C. § 1601, which emphasizes the
need for noncitizens to be self-sufficient and rely on their own capabilities); Justin Storch, Legal
Impediments Facing Nonimmigrants Entering Licensed Professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12, 15 (2011)
(discussing the relevance of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(v)(A), which addresses state licensure as a
requirement for obtaining a nonimmigrant visa with H-classification).
113. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202.
114. Id. at 223.
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Although the Court purported to apply rational basis review in Plyler, it
struck down the Texas statute under a heightened level of scrutiny. 115 The
Court explained:
In determining the rationality of [the Texas statute], we may
appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the
innocent children who are its victims. In light of these
countervailing costs, the discrimination ... can hardly be
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the
1 16
State.
The Court went on to find that the classification excluding undocumented
children was unjustified by the State's interests in preserving resources,
protecting itself against an influx of undocumented immigrants, providing
high-quality education, or educating only those children likely to remain
within its borders. 117 Since the classification did not further any
substantial state interest, the Court concluded that denying "a discrete
group of innocent children the free public education
that it offers to other
118
children" violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Some federal appellate courts have gone further by restricting the
application of strict scrutiny to state laws that discriminate against LPRs.
Conflicting interpretations of Supreme Court precedents have resulted in a
circuit split about whether strict scrutiny applies to nonimmigrants, a
technical term for individuals who have temporary visas, not permanent
residency. Nonimmigrant visas are granted for specific purposes and
limited periods of time. 119 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that
rational basis review applies to nonimmigrants, whereas the Second
Circuit has held that strict scrutiny applies to all lawfully present

115. Id. at 220 ("It is .. .difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these
children for their presence within the United States."); id. at 223-24 (examining the "rationality" of the
Texas statute and whether it "furthers some substantial goal of the State"). Justice Powell's
concurrence noted that "review in a case such as [this] is properly heightened." Id. at 238 & n.2
(Powell, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 223-24 (majority opinion).
117. Id. at227-30.
118. Id. at230.
119. Examples of nonimmigrant visas include tourist visas, temporary work visas, student visas,
investor visas, and visas for entertainers or athletes.
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• . 120

noncitizens.
The Ninth• • Circuit
. 121has also implicitly found that strict
scrutiny applies to nonimmigrants.
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit applied rational basis review to a
Louisiana Supreme Court rule that required applicants for admission to the
Louisiana State Bar to be citizens or LPRs. 122 The court construed
Supreme Court decisions such as Graham as justifying strict scrutiny
based on two conditions specific to LPRs: (1) their similarity to citizens in
their economic, social, and civic conditions; and (2) their inability to exert
political power, despite this similarity. 123 The court then distinguished
nonimmigrants on the basis that they are not "entrenched" in society like
LPRs, their lack of political power is "tied to their temporary connection
to this country," and "the numerous variations among nonimmigrant
aliens' admission status make it inaccurate to describe them as a class that
is 'discrete' or 'insular. ' 124 The court therefore rejected arguments that
nonimmigrants constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class and applied only
rational basis review. 12 5 Judge Higginbotham, who dissented from the
court's denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, cautioned that 'judicially
crafting a subset of aliens, scaled by how it perceives the aliens' proximity
to citizenship
....is a bold step not sanctioned by Supreme Court
' 126
precedent."
In a 2011 decision, Van Staden v. St. Martin, the Fifth Circuit relied on
LeClerc in applying rational basis review to uphold a Louisiana rule
restricting nursing licenses to permanent residents and citizens. 127 In that
case, the appellant was a citizen of South Africa who had lived in the
128
United States since 2001 and was a licensed practical nurse in Texas.
When she moved to Louisiana in 2007, she was denied a nursing license
based solely on her immigration status, although that status authorized her
to work as a nurse in the United States. 12 9 Van Staden applied for

120. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2012); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 530-36 (6th Cir. 2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420-21
(5th Cir. 2005).
121. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2014) (involving nonimmigrants residing in
Hawaii under the Compact of Free Association with the United States).
122. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 420.
123. Id. at417.
124. Id.
125. Id. at417-20.
126. LeClerc v. Webb, 444 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 2006) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
127. Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 57-62 (5th Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at 57.
129. Id.
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permanent resident status, but the Fifth Circuit found that a pending
application was not enough to trigger strict scrutiny. 130 The court held that
"LeClerc draws a clean line between permanent resident aliens and
nonimmigrant aliens," and that LPR applicants' 131
like Van Staden "fall into
former."
the
to
close
if
even
category,
latter
the
The Sixth Circuit followed in the Fifth Circuit's footsteps in applying
rational basis review to a Tennessee law that required proof of US
citizenship or permanent resident status to obtain a driver's license. 132 The
Sixth Circuit distinguished Nyquist, where the Supreme Court had applied
strict scrutiny to a New York law that denied state financial assistance for
higher education to nonimnmigrants
as •well as LPRs,
primarily on the basis
•
•133
that both of the plaintiffs in that case were LPRs.
The court then
adopted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in LeClerc, distinguishing
nonimmigrants from LPRs on the basis that they "are admitted to the
United States only for the duration of their authorized status, are not
permitted to serve in the U.S. military, are subject to strict employment
restrictions, incur differential tax treatment, and may be denied federal
welfare benefits." 134 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gilman advocated
"taking the Supreme Court at its word when it reaffirmed in Graham that
'classifications based on alienage ... are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny.'135
The Second,• Circuit
has completely rejected the Fifth and Sixth
136
In Dandamudiv. Tisch, the Second Circuit explained
Circuit's analysis.
that the Supreme Court had never used proximity to citizenship as a test
for determining whether a given group of noncitizens should be
considered a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny. 137 Furthermore, the
Second Circuit found that "the Supreme Court recognizes aliens generally
' 138
as a discrete and insular minority without significant political clout."
The court also reasoned that even if the appropriate level of scrutiny did
depend on the noncitizens' proximity to citizenship, it would still apply
strict scrutiny because nonimnmigrants pay taxes, are sometimes allowed to

130. Id. at 60-61.
131. Id. at 59.
132. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2007).

133.
134.
135.
(1971)).
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 542 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 75-79 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 75-77.
Id. at 75.
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have the intent of remaining permanently in the United States, and were
authorized by the federal government to work in the very occupation from
which New York was excluding them. 139 The court noted that
nonimmigrants often remain in the United States for many years and
frequently become LPRs. 14 Finally, the Second Circuit found that
applying rational basis review to nonimmigrants would create absurd
results, since the Supreme Court had applied
heightened rational basis
41
review to undocumented children in Plyler.
While the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed this issue like the
Second Circuit, it has implicitly indicated that strict scrutiny would apply
to nonimmigrants subjected to discriminatory state laws. In Korab v. Fink,
the court considered whether nonimmigrants residing in Hawaii under a
Compact of Free Association with the United States ("COFA residents")
could be excluded from state-funded health care benefits pursuant to the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996.142 The focus of the court in that case was
whether to categorize the discrimination as state or federal, since that
would dictate the standard of review. 143 At no point did the court suggest
that the nonimmigrant status of the COFA residents triggered rational
basis review. If that were the case, the court144
could have resolved the case
without analyzing a complex, hybrid statute.
A lacuna in the law remains not only regarding the standard of review
for nonimmigrants, but also for individuals who are authorized to be in the
country but do not have a legal status. This group includes, among others,
noncitizens with deferred action status or temporary protected status,
individuals who have been paroled into the United States or who have
pending applications for various forms of relief (such as asylum and
cancellation of removal), and noncitizens granted withholding of removal
or protection under the Convention Against Torture based on a risk of
persecution or torture in their home countries. All of these individuals are
lawfully present in the United States, as they have authorization to be here
for at least a temporary period of time, do not
,• accrue
.
145"unlawful presence,"
and are eligible to apply for work authorization.
For some of these

139. Id. at 77.
140. Id. at 78.
141. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982)).
142. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2014).
143. Id. at 580-84.
144. See id. at 585 (Bybee, J., concurring).
145. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2016) (describing classes of aliens authorized to accept
employment); Interoffice Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic
Operations Directorate, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. et al., to Field Leadership (May 6,
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categories, the individual may be authorized to remain in the United States
even after a deportation order is issued. For example, when a noncitizen is
granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention
Against Torture, a deportation order is issued, but the deportation is
withheld indefinitely. Similarly, individuals who are ordered deported but
obtain a stay of removal may be granted deferred action status for a
temporary period.
So far, only the Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to consider what
standard of review applies to these categories of noncitizens with "less"
than nonimmigrant status. In a recent case, the court considered the
constitutionality of an Arizona statute that prohibited DACA recipients
from using their work permits as evidence of their lawful presence in the
United States, while allowing similarly situated individuals with pending
applications
for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status to do
146
so.
In reversing the denial of a preliminary injunction, the court found
that the equal protection claim would likely succeed. 147 However, it did
not decide if the standard of review is strict scrutiny or rational basis or
something in between, because it found that Arizona's law would not even
survive the rational basis test.148 Thus, courts have yet to weigh in on the
proper standard of review for equal protection claims involving
noncitizens with deferred action status or other types of authorized periods
of stay that do not amount to a visa of any kind.
B. Discriminationby the FederalGovernment
1. Rational Basis Review and the Plenary Power
Although alienage-based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny
when made by states, at least if they affect LPRs, such classifications
receive great deference when made by the federal government due to the
plenary power doctrine. 14 9 The Court has held that Congress possesses
plenary power over immigration based on its constitutional authority to

2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static Files
Memoranda/2009/revision redesign AFM.PDF.
146. Ariz. Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1063-67 (9th Cir. 2014).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1065-67.
149. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 853-54 (1987); see also generally Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV.
255 (arguing that the Court has been unusually deferential in the area of immigration).
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establish a "Uniform Rule of Naturalization" and "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations." 150 While the plenary power doctrine was initially
articulated in a case upholding the exclusion of Chinese laborers from the
United States, the Court has found that it extends far beyond the admission
and exclusion of immigrants, giving Congress power over almost all

aspects of noncitizens' lives. 151 During the early part of the twentieth
century, the
Supreme Court discussed
the plenary power only in relation to
152
..
Congress.
Subsequent decisions, however, have explicitly extended the
plenary power to the President, based on the President's inherent authority
over foreign affairs, which derives from the authority "to make Treaties,"
to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls," and to
"receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers. 153 The Court has also
found that the power to exclude noncitizens is inherent to national
sovereignty.154
While the plenary power is quite broad, it does not render government
action completely immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court has

150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3-4; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (noting that
Congress has "broad power over naturalization and immigration"); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
354 (1976) ("Power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."),
superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Star.
3445, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 588-90 (2011); Takahashi v.
Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 713 (1893)) ("The authority to control immigration... is vested solely in the Federal
government.").
151. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's
Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1, 53-73 (1998); Legomsky, supra note 149, at 255-60; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE
L.J. 545, 549 (1990).
152. E.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334 (1932)
("Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, control of the admission of aliens is committed
exclusively to Congress.
...
); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914) ("The authority of
Congress over the general subject-matter is plenary; it may exclude aliens altogether, or prescribe the
terms and conditions upon which they may come into or remain in this country."); Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) ("[O]ver no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over [immigration].").
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3; see also, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81 (referring
to the "narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of
immigratiof'); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) ("The exclusion
of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power
but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation."); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing "the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress").
154. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.
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acknowledged its limits in cases dating back at least one hundred years. 155
In Knauff, the Court recognized thatjudicial review remains available for
constitutional and statutory claims.
The Court's language in Kleindienst
v. Mandel, which involved the Attorney General's discretionary decision
to deny a waiver of inadmissibility, further found that the Executive did
not have "unfettered discretion."1 57 There, the Court reviewed the decision
to ensure that there waso..a "facially
legitimate and bona fide" reason for the
..
158
agency's exercise of discretion.
In Mathews v. Diaz, decided a few years later, the Court explicitly
applied rational basis review to alienage-based classifications by the
federal government. 159 Diaz upheld distinctions based on alienage in the
federal Medicare statute, which required legal permanent residents, but not
citizens, to satisfy a five-year residency requirement to qualify for certain
benefits. 16 Due to the "narrow standard of review of decisions made by
the Congress or the President in the area of immigration," the Court found
that Congress is allowed to enact laws that treat citizens and noncitizens
differently, as long as those laws are rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. 161 Accordingly, the Court found it "unquestionably
reasonable for Congress to make an alien's [benefit] eligibility depend on
•
•
•
,,162
•
•
both the character and the duration of his residence.
Since Diaz,
federal appellate courts have repeatedly upheld alienage classifications in
federal statutes pertaining to benefits under rational basis review. 163 Only

155. See, e.g., Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915) ("[W]hen the record shows that a
commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power, the alien may demand his release upon habeas

corpus."); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (reasoning that even though the political
branches have plenary power, a noncitizen denied entry into the United States "is doubtless entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful").
156. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543-46 (rejecting the petitioner's claims that the regulations were
unreasonable or that the War Brides Act required a hearing, and acknowledging that the Attorney
General had acted pursuant to valid regulations); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695
(2001) (noting that the plenary power "is subject to important constitutional limitations"); INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301, 311 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that judicial review is
available "as a means of reviewing the legality of [the order of removal]" even where the statute
"preclud[es] judicial review to the maximum extent possible under the Constitution").
157. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972).
158. Id.
159. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
160. Id. at 79-87.
161. Id. at 81-89.
162. Id. at 82-83.
163. E.g., Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582-84 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding Welfare Reform
Act restrictions on alien eligibility for state-administered prenatal Medicaid benefits); Aleman v.
Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1197-1204 (9th Cir. 2000) (same for food stamps); City of Chicago v.
Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 603-09 (7th Cir. 1999) (same for supplemental security income ("SSJ") and
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in a handful of cases have courts invalidated
federal government action
164
pertaining to immigration as irrational.
2. Allocation of Power Between Congress and the President

Although the plenary power applies to both Congress and the
President, the precise allocation of power between the legislative and
executive branches remains far from clear. 165 Despite the development of

a detailed Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), Presidents have
exercised significant control over immigration. 166 Primarily, the Executive
exercises power over immigration through prosecutorial discretion
regarding whom to deport, which means that' 167the President's power is
"almost entirely at the back end of the system."
President Obama, through the Secretary of DHS, presented the
expanded DACA and DAPA policies as an exercise of such prosecutorial
discretion on a large scale. 8Cases such as Heckler v. Chaney indicate
that an agency's decision about whether to exercise its enforcement
authority, or to exercise it in a particular way, is largely immune from
judicial review. 169 Yet a lawsuit brought by twenty-six states is currently
challenging the President's authority to implement expanded DACA and
DAPA. 17 The states counter Chaney with Youngstown, where Justice
Jackson famously set forth a three-part framework for analyzing deference

food stamps); Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1346-53 (11 th Cir. 1999) (same for SSI and
food stamps).
164. Some examples of cases where the Court actually struck down a federal alienage-based
classification under rational basis review include: Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1995)
(striking down under rational basis review a statute that permitted discretionary relief to those seeking
to enter the country but not to those already here), supersededby statute, Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Star. 3009, as recognized in
Villalva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 591 F. App'x 732, 735 (1lth Cir. 2014); Wauchope v. U.S. Dep't of
State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1412-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding a classification irrational that conferred
citizenship on the children of some male citizens but not on the children of similarly situated female
citizens); Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F. Supp. 479, 488-91 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (same); see also Chin,
supra note 151, at 53-73 (arguing that racial discrimination in immigration laws would not now be
permitted under the rational basis standard).
165. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrfguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J.
458 (2009).
166. See id.
at 485-91.
167. Id. at519.
168. Memorandum on Expanded DACA and DAPA, supra note 6.
169. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
598, 607 (1985) ("[T]he Government's enforcement priorities, and .. .the Government's overall
enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake.").
170. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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to executive power. 17 1 Under that framework, "[w]hen the President takes
measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb." 17 2
The district court judge who issued a temporary preliminary injunction
in February 2015 halting the expanded DACA and DAPA policies agreed
with the states that Chaney did not govern. 173 The court found that Chaney
applies to agency inaction, but that DAPA constitutes affirmative agency
action. 174 Specifically, the court found that DAPA "awards legal presence
...as well as the ability to obtain Social Security numbers, work
authorization permits, and the ability to travel." 175 In addition, the district
court in Texas found that there was no specific statute authorizing
expanded DACA and DAPA, noting that the President announced it was
Congress's failure to pass a law that had prompted him to "change the
law." 176 In fact, the court found that expanded DACA and DAPA
contradict[] Congress' statutory goals." 17 7 In stating that "the discretion
178
given to the DHS Secretary is not unlimited, "
the decision calls into
question the precise reach of the President's supposedly plenary power
over immigration and where the line between executive and legislative
power should be drawn.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with this reasoning, finding that "[d]eferred
action ...is much more than non-enforcement," and that the expanded
DACA and DAPA policies exceeded the discretionary authority given to

171.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring).
172. Id. at 637-38; see also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002) ("Justice Jackson's concurrence

outlined the three now-canonical categories that guide modem analysis of separation of powers ....
173. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2015).

174. Id. at 654.
175. Id.; see also id. at 658-59. Similarly, an earlier decision by a federal district court judge in
Pennsylvania had held, in a case involving a single individual, that the President's DACA and DAPA

programs went "beyond prosecutorial discretion" and amounted to legislation by establishing a
relatively rigid framework for considering applications for deferred action. United States v. JuarezEscobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 786-88 (W.D. Pa. 2014); see also John C. Eastman, From Plyler to
Arizona: Have the Courts Forgotten About Corfield v. Coryell?, 80 U. Cl-.L. REV. 165, 187 (2013)

(stating that the President's enforcement discretion cannot involve a "comprehensive and sweeping
immigration scheme" that contravenes the Immigration and Nationality Act).
176. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 657 & n.71 (quoting Press Release, The White House Office of the
Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President on Immigration-Chicago, IL (Nov. 25, 2014)); see also id. at

661 ("[N]o statute gives the DHS the discretion it is trying to exercise here.").
177. Id. at 663.
178. Id. at 660.
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DHS. 179 The court found that the Secretary of DHS's interpretation of the
INA's provisions "would allow him to grant lawful presence and work
authorization to any illegal alien in the United States-an untenable
position in light of the INA's intricate system of immigration
classifications and employment eligibility." 180 The court further explained
that "[e]ven with 'special deference' to the Secretary, the INA flatly does
not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully
present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and
state benefits, including work authonization. 181 According to the court,
broad grants of authority in the INA "cannot reasonably be construed as
assigning decisions of vast economic and political significance, such as
DAPA, to an agency." 182 The detailed dissenting opinion by Judge King
challenged this reasoning, concluding that deferred action is a
presumptively unreviewable brand of prosecutorial discretion. 183 This case
highlights deeply contested areas in the allocation of immigration power
between Congress and the executive branch that will 184
eventually need to be
Court.
Supreme
the
of
complement
full
a
resolved by
3. Allocation of Power Within the Executive Branch
Not only is the allocation of immigration authority between the two
political branches of government unclear, but so is the allocation of that
power within the executive branch, which remains largely unexplored by
courts and scholars alike. There is no doubt that alienage-based
classifications made by the executive agency with direct responsibility
over immigration, the Department of Homeland Security, would receive
only rational basis review. But what if Congress delegates the authority to
make alienage-based classifications to another agency that has no

179. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 906
(2016).
180. Id. at 184.
181. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661,665 (5th Cir. 1997)).
182. Id. at 183 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching this conclusion,
the majority relied, in part, on King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted) ("Whether those [tax] credits are available on Federal Exchanges [under the ACA] is thus a
question of deep economic and political significance that is central to this statutory scheme; had
Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly."). See
Texas, 809 F.3d at 181-82.
183. Texas, 809 F.3d at 218 (King, J., dissenting).
184. As mentioned above, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision
in a one-sentence per curiam decision. See United States v. Texas, No. 15-674, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June
23, 2016) (per curiam).
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immigration expertise, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Social
Security Administration, or the Department of Transportation?
The only Supreme Court case that addresses this issue has been rightly
described as "opaque." 185 In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, which was
decided the same day as Mathews v. Diaz, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a regulation issued by the US Civil Service
Commission that excluded all persons except US citizens and natives 186
of
American Samoa from employment in most positions of federal service.
One thing that Mow Sun Wong made clear is that the powers Congress and
the President have over immigration do not mean that any federal entity
automatically evades judicial scrutiny in creating classifications based on
alienage. The Court expressly rejected the argument that "the federal
power over aliens is so plenary that any agent of the National Government
may arbitrarily subject all resident
aliens to different substantive rules
18 7
citizens."
to
applied
those
from
The Court explained that "[w]hen the Federal Government asserts an
overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which
would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due
process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule
was actually intended to serve that interest." 188 In determining whether an
agency's regulation was intended to serve an overriding national interest,
the Court set forth two alternative tests: (1) whether the agency had direct
responsibility over immigration; and (2) whether the agency had an
189
express mandate from Congress or the President.
First, the Court examined whether the agency that promulgated the rule
had "direct responsibility for fostering or protecting" the overriding
national interest. 19 The Court found that the Civil Service Commission
had "no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for
establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for

185. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2371 (2001) ("The
Court's reasoning in Hampton was notably opaque .... ); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,
67 U. Cm. L. REV. 315, 337 (2000) ("To say the least, Mow Sun Wong is an opaque opinion.").
186. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
187. Id. at 101 (emphasis added); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage,
Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 201, 211-12 (1994) (noting that in Mow Sun
Wong, "the Court held that a federal interest in immigration and alienage matters must be articulated
by those who are institutionally competent to do so").
188. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103.
189. Id.
190. Id.

1304

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

93:1271

naturalization policies." 19 1 The Court stressed that it was "not willing to
presume that the Chairman of the Civil Services Commission... was
deliberately fostering an interest so far removed from his normal
responsibilities.'" 192 Upon examining the interests that supposedly
supported the regulation excluding noncitizens from federal employment,
the Court found that all except one (administrative convenience) were "not
matters which are properly the business of the Commission." 193 The Court
then rejected administrative convenience as a justification for the
regulation, applying what appears to be a due process balancing test to
conclude that "the public interest in avoiding the wholesale deprivation of
employment opportunities caused by the Commission's indiscriminate
policy" outweighed this "hypothetical j ustification." 19 4
The second test used by the Court to determine if the regulation was
intended to serve an overriding national interest involved analyzing
whether the regulation was "expressly mandated by the Congress or the
President." 195 Congress had delegated to the President the power to
"prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil
service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that
service.
The President, in turn, had issued an Executive Order
directing the Civil Service Commission to "establish standards with
respect to citizenship." 197 Pursuant to this authority, the Civil Service
Commission had promulgated
the regulation barring noncitizens from
198
federal employment.
The Court did not find Congress's general delegation of authority
sufficient to justify the regulation and, after searching the Appropriations
Acts, found no evidence of "either Congressional approval or disapproval
of the specific Commission rule." 199 Turning next to the President's
Executive Order, the Court explained that even if this Order allowed the
Commission to require citizenship for all federal positions, "the decision
to impose the requirement was made by the Commission rather than the
President. ' 2° ° In other words, the President's Executive Order did not

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 103.
5 U.S.C. § 3301(1) (2014); Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 114-15.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 103-16.
Id.at 111-12.
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expressly mandate the Commission's rule, as evidenced by the
Commission's ability to either retain or modify the citizenship20 requirement
1
without further authorization from the President or Congress.
The Court's findings that the Civil Service Commission had no direct
responsibility over immigration-related national interests, and that neither
Congress nor the President had expressly mandated the exclusion of
noncitizens from federal employment, both played a critical role in the
holding that the regulation was invalid. 2 02 A third factor that contributed to
the Court's decision was the fact that the regulation raised a constitutional
question. It is because the regulation "deprive[d] a discrete class of
persons of an interest in liberty on a wholesale basis" that the Court found
that "some judicial scrutiny" was required. 2 03 Although the Court never
specified what level of scrutiny was appropriate, its decision to strike
down the regulation indicates a heightened standard of review. 204 To be
clear, the Court did not find that the Civil Service Commission had
exceeded its delegated authority in promulgating the regulation. 2 05 Rather,
the Court found that the agency's regulation would not be given the
deferential6 review that federal classifications involving alienage normally
20
receive.
The reasoning in Mow Sun Wong resonates with the Supreme Court's
2015 decision in King v. Burwell, which involved a challenge to an IRS
regulation that authorized tax credits for purchases on both state and
federal health insurance exchanges established under the ACA. 207 There,
the petitioners argued that the ACA only authorized tax credits for health
insurance purchased through state exchanges. 2 0 8 In an unusual step, the
Court decided not to apply Chevron deference but to interpret the statutory
language itself, reasoning that tax credits are one of the ACA's key
reforms, and "had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it

201. Id. at 112-14.
202. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
203. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103.
204. See Roger C. Hartley, Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymaking: A Separation
of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 99-100 (2007) (interpreting Mow Sun

Wong to hold that a heightened standard of judicial review is required where the decision to
discriminate is not made by Congress or the President).
205. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with

Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1774 (2001) (arguing
that Mow Sun Wong is a leading case on "constitutional 'who' rules"); Hartley, supra note 204, at 98100.
206. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88.
207. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
208. Id. at 2487.
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S,,209

surely would have done so expressly.
The Court found it "especially
unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS,
2 10
which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort."
Even without the specter of the constitutional issues that existed in Mow
Sun Wong, the Court was skeptical that Congress would allow an agency
to make an important decision in an area where it lacked relevant
expertise.
Similarly, in Gonzales v. Oregon, a case about physician-assisted
suicide, the Court was wary of the Attorney General's "claimed authority
to determine appropriate medical standards. ' 2 11 The Court reasoned:
Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account
in the first instance for the presumption that Congress delegates
interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than to the
reviewing court, we presume here that Congress intended to invest
interpretive power in the2 12administrative actor in the best position to
develop these attributes.
Any deference that the Court normally would have given to the
Department of Justice's interpretation was "tempered by the Attorney
General's lack of expertise in this area and the apparent absence of any
consultation with anyone2 13
outside the Department of Justice who might aid
in a reasoned judgment."
The decisions in Mow Sun Wong, King, and Gonzales all demonstrate

the Court's reluctance to defer to an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous
. 214statutory provision if the subject is outside the agency's area of
expertise.
When constitutional issues are at stake, the need for expertise
is especially important. While Wong has not had many progeny, it remains
good law and indicates that executive agencies..,.
are .not 215
always equivalent
classifications.
alienage-based
create
in their authority to

209. Id. at 2489.
210. Id.
211. 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006).
212. Id. at 266-67 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S.
144, 153 (1991)).
213. Id. at 269.
214. Cf Sunstein, supra note 185, at 337 ("The narrowest reading of the opinion [in Mow Sun
Wong] is that the Court will not interpret an ambiguous statutory provision to allow an agency to reach
a constitutionally questionable decision on a subject outside its expertise.").
215. Justice Powell relied on Wong in two cases involving race-conscious programs. See Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (reasoning that "the
legitimate interest in creating a race-conscious remedy is not compelling unless an appropriate
governmental authority has found that [past discrimination] has occurred"); Regents of the Univ. of
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C. DiscriminationPursuantto Federal-StateHybrids
Under the framework established by Graham and Mathews, laws that
would violate equal protection if enacted by a state are usually legitimate
if enacted by Congress. 2 16 The analysis becomes more complicated,
however, when the federal government authorizes states to discriminate
based on alienage. 2 17 The Naturalization Clause authorizes Congress "[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . ..throughout the United
States. ' 2 18 Accordingly, Plyler advised, "if the Federal Government has by
uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the
treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal
direction. ' 2 19 But courts do not always agree on what constitutes a
"uniform" rule. In fact, courts are currently divided about what standard of
review applies to alienage-based eligibility restrictions in state laws
implementing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the "Welfare Reform Act"), as some have
concluded that the statute prescribes a uniform rule, while others see no
such uniformity.
The Welfare Reform Act provides eligibility requirements regarding
noncitizens' access to both federal and state benefits. For state-funded
benefits, the Act creates a category of noncitizens to whom states must
provide all benefits, another category of noncitizens to whom states cannot
provide any benefits, and a third category of noncitizens for whom states
are given discretion to determine what, if any, benefits to provide. 22 0 This
third category, which allows states to determine benefit eligibility based
on alienage, has been challenged in both federal and state courts. On the
federal level, three appellate courts-the First, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits-have addressed this issue and upheld state restrictions under
rational basis review. 22 1 On the state level, the highest courts of New

Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309-10 (1978) (rejecting the Regents' affirmative action plan and
explaining that the Regents lacked the "capability" to make the necessary findings and adopt the
policy, as it was not within their "broad mission" and they did not have a mandate to do so from the
state legislature).
216. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976).
217. See generally Michael J.Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).

218. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.
4.
219. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (emphasis added).
220. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1624 (2014).
221. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2014); Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir.
2004); see also Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014) (denying the equal protection claim on
the basis that the Medicaid-eligible noncitizens were not similarly situated to citizens).
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York, Maryland, and Massachusetts have all applied strict scrutiny and
struck down such restrictions as a violation of equal protection.
Connecticut's Supreme Court applied rational basis review, but only after
finding that
the state statute did not actually discriminate based on
222
alienage.
1. DecisionsApplying Rational Basis Review

In Soskin v. Reinertson, the Tenth Circuit considered the argument that
allowing states to determine benefit eligibility under the Welfare Reform
Act violated the Naturalization Clause of the US Constitution, which
requires Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" and has
been interpreted broadly to refer to federal control over the status of
aliens. 223 In rejecting this argument, the Court examined the historical
origins of the Naturalization Clause, which was a response to divergent
state naturalization laws that allowed an alien ineligible for citizenship in
one state to become a citizen in another state and then return
• to•the
. original
224
state as a citizen entitled to all of its privileges and immunities.
The
Tenth Circuit found that the purpose of the uniformity requirement was
not undermined by the discretion given to states under the Welfare Reform
Act because "the choice by one state to grant or deny ...

benefits to an

225
alien does not require another state to follow suit."
The Ninth Circuit recently agreed with the Tenth Circuit's analysis in
Korab v. Fink, finding that the Welfare Reform Act as a whole
"establishes a uniform federal structure for providing welfare benefits to
distinct classes of aliens," and that "a state's limited discretion to
implement a plan for a specified category of aliens does not defeat or
undermine uniformity.
Analogizing to bankruptcy law, the court
explained that the principle of uniformity does not require the elimination
of differences among states, but rather that the basic operation of the

222. Compare Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2006), Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins.
Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 2011), and Aliessa ex rel.
Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d
1085 (N.Y. 2001), with Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011) (applying rational basis
review).
223. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 4; Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256-57.
224. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256-57; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 36 (1824); THE
FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
225. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1257.
226. Korab, 797 F.3d at 581.
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federal statute be uniform. 22 7 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit upheld
Hawaii's decision to deny Medicaid benefits to noncitizens from three
Micronesian nations who were lawfully present in the country as
nonimmigrants pursuant to Compacts of Free Association that those
nations had with the United States. 22 8 The case, however, produced three
separate opinions, and it does not appear that two of the judges actually
agreed on the equal protection analysis. Judge Bybee, who wrote a
concurring opinion, based his vote on a preemption analysis,
acknowledging that "if we looked exclusively to equal protection
principles, I think it is likely that Hawai'i's law would fall."2 29
The dissents in Soskin and Korab argued that strict scrutiny was the
correct standard of review, stressing Graham's warning that "Congress
does not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the
Equal Protection Clause.' 230 Both dissents challenged the majorities'
conclusion that Congress had created a uniform law in allowing states to
decide whether to restrict eligibility for benefits for certain noncitizens.
Judge Clifton, dissenting in Korab, noted that "[a] federal 'direction' that
points in two opposite ways is not a direction" and characterized
Congress's delegation of power to the states as a "lit firecracker, at risk of
exploding when
,.,231a state exercised its discretion to discriminate on the basis
of alienage.
He found that the majority's analogy to the
conceptualization of uniformity in bankruptcy law failed to fit because that
analogy ignored "the crucially important counterweight" of the Equal
Protection Clause, which is absent from the bankruptcy arena. 2 32 In Judge
Clifton's view, "[t]he option given to the states by Congress to decide
whether to treat aliens differently was illusory," in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Graham.
Both dissents also noted that, under
Graham, a state's financial condition does not provide a compelling
234
justification to treat noncitizens differently.
While the First Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Tenth and
Ninth Circuits in reviewing Maine's legislation terminating noncitizens

227. Id. at 581-82. For a critique of this analogy to bankruptcy law, see Wishnie, supra note 217,
at 535-37.
228. Korab, 797 F.3d at 577-84.
229. Id. at 597-98 (Bybee, J., concurring).
230. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971); Korab, 797 F.3d at 599, 602-05 (Clifton,
J., dissenting) (citing Graham); Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1265468, 1270-75 (Henry, J., dissenting) (same).
231. Korab, 797 F.3d at 602, 605 (Clifton, J., dissenting).

232. Id. at 603-04.
233. Id. at 599.
234. Id. at 600; Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1272-73 (Henry, J., dissenting).
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from state benefits, it applied a different analysis. 235 The court found that
the disparate treatment of noncitizens was not attributable to Maine's
statute but to the Welfare Reform Act's alienage-based restrictions on
eligibility for public welfare benefits. 236 Accordingly, the court found "no
class of similarly situated citizens with whom the appellants can be
compared vis-h-vis the state of Maine," which undermined the equal
protection claim.237 In light of its finding that Maine had drawn no
distinctions based on alienage, the court found it unnecessary to reach the
issue of whether Maine was following a uniform federal policy. 23 8 Thus,
not only are courts divided about the standard of review, but the courts
that have rejected equal protection challenges do not agree on the
reasoning.
2. DecisionsApplying Strict Scrutiny

Like the dissents in the Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions discussed
above, the three state courts that applied strict scrutiny to strike down
similar state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause reasoned that
Congress had failed to prescribe a "uniform" rule by allowing states to
determine for themselves the extent to which they would discriminate
against certain categories of noncitizens. In Matter of Aliessa, New York's
highest court addressed an equal protection challenge to a state law that
implemented title IV of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.239 Prior to that Act,
New York had provided state Medicaid to needy recipients without
distinguishing between legal aliens and citizens. 24 The court examined
"whether title [V can constitutionally authorize New York to determine for
itself the extent to which it will discriminate against legal aliens for State
Medicaid eligibility. '"24 1 In holding that Congress could not authorize such
discrimination, the court relied heavily on Graham, which had explained
that "congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures
to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for
federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene [the]

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014).
Id. at71.
Id.
Id.
Aliessa ex rel.
Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 1089-90.
Id. at 1096-99.
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explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity." 242 The court reasoned
that title IV does not impose a uniform immigration rule for states to
follow, as it authorizes states to extend state benefits even to aliens not
lawfully present, while also authorizing states to withhold state Medicaid
even from aliens eligible for federal Medicaid. 243 In other words, "States
are free to discriminate in either direction-producing not uniformity, but
potentially wide variation based on localized or idiosyncratic concepts of
largesse, economics and politics." 244 According to the court, a uniform
rule would require each state to "carry out the same policy under the
mandate of Congress-the only body with authority to set immigration
policy. ' 24 5 The court concluded that title IV was "directly in the teeth of
Graham" by authorizing states to extend the ineligibility period for federal
Medicaid for LPRs beyond five years and terminate federal Medicaid
eligibility for refugees and asylees after seven years. Indeed, the court
found that title IV went "significantly beyond what the Graham Court
declared constitutionally questionable" by "impermissibly authoriz[ing]
each State to decide whether to disqualify many otherwise eligible aliens
from State Medicaid." 246 The court therefore
applied strict scrutiny and
. . ..
247
held that the state law violated equal protection.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with the reasoning of the
New York Court of Appeals. Prior to 2006, Maryland chose to provide
non-emergency medical benefits to LPRs excluded from federal benefits
by the Welfare Reform
•
248 Act because they did not satisfy a five-year
residency requirement.
Maryland's Fiscal Year 2006 budget cut off
249
these benefits.
In Ehrlich v. Perez, the court considered an equal
protection challenge to the termination of benefits for this group of
LPRs. 25 The parties agreed that if Congress had prescribed "a truly
uniform rule" for the treatment of aliens, and a state abided by that rule in
discriminating against or between resident aliens, then an equal protection
challenge would receive only rational basis review. 25 1 After a lengthy
analysis of Supreme Court decisions, the court assumed, without deciding,

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971)).
Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098-99.
Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1225 (Md. 2006).
Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 1232.
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that this "uniform rule" principle was correct. 25 2 But the court found that
the Welfare Reform Act prescribed no such uniform rule, since Congress
had provided the states with "unbridled discretion" to decide whether or
not to provide state-funded medical benefits
to resident aliens who did not
•
253
meet the five-year residency requirement.
The court reasoned that
Congress's "grant of discretion, without more, is not a uniform rule for
purposes of imposing only a rational basis test." 254 In other words, "[t]his
laissez faire federal approach to granting discretionary authority to the
States ... does
not prescribe
5
25

a single,

uniform or comprehensive

approach.
Along the same lines, from 2006 to 2009, Massachusetts allowed aliens
who are federally ineligible under the Welfare Reform Act to256
participate in
the state's Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Program.
While the
program is supported by both state and federal funds, only state funds
were used to subsidize federally ineligible enrollees. 257 In 2009, the state
legislature passed a statute that adopted the same eligibility standards set
forth in the Welfare Reform Act.
Residents of Massachusetts who lost
their health insurance or were found ineligible based on their alienage
brought a class action arguing that their right to equal protection had been
violated. 25 9 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that
strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. 2 6 The court
stressed that the Welfare Reform Act allows States to choose whether or
not to follow federal eligibility rules and "merely declares that Federal
policy will not be thwarted if States decide to discriminate against
qualified aliens.' 261 In this situation, "[w]here the State is left with a range
of options including discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies, its
selection amongst those options must be reviewed under the standards
applicable to the State and not those applicable to Congress. ' 262 The court
contrasted this scenario, where Congress "enacts a noncompulsory rule"
that the state voluntarily adopts, with a situation where Congress

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 1240-41.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
Id.
Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 (Mass. 2011).
Id. at 1266-67.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1277.
Id.
Id.
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establishes "uniform national guidelines and policies dictating how States
are to regulate and legislate issues relating to aliens," clarifying that strict
scrutiny3 applies to the former, although rational basis review applies to the
26

latter.

The conclusions of these state courts are directly antithetical to the
conclusions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, creating a division among
courts about the proper standard of review for hybrid statutes that bridge
state and federal action.
D. Summary of Standards of Review

The foregoing demonstrates that alienage-based classifications have
evaded any clear system of tiered scrutiny. At the state level, where
alienage is supposed to be treated as a suspect classification, uncertainty
remains as to whether all lawfully present aliens, or just some subset of
them, are entitled to strict scrutiny. At the federal level, where the plenary
power restricts the extent of judicial review, there are mounting questions
about whether the same deference is owed to the President as to Congress
in immigration matters. In addition, there is little guidance beyond Mow
Sun Wong to explain the deference owed to an executive agency without
direct responsibility over immigration that chooses to impose alienagebased classifications absent an express mandate from Congress or the
President. Finally, courts are divided about whether states engage in
prohibited discrimination when they decide to adopt alienage-based
classifications articulated by Congress in federal statutes. Each of these
gray areas complicates the analysis of whether the exclusion of DACA
recipients from the ACA violates equal protection principles.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF THE EXCLUSION OF DACA
RECIPIENTS FROM THE

ACA

Given Congress's plenary power over matters affecting noncitizens,
this Article does not dispute that Congress was authorized to decide that
only "a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present
in the United States" may be treated as a "qualified individual" and
"covered under a qualified health plan in the individual market that is

263. Id. at 1274-75 (contrasting the present case to the uniform rule that was challenged in Doe v.
Comm 'r of TransitionalAssistance, 773 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Mass. 2002), and received rational basis
review).
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offered through an Exchange. ' 264 Nor does this Article challenge
Congress's authorization to delegate to HHS the job of determining who is
"lawfully present in the United States. ' 265 Instead, this Part explores what
standard of review should apply to HHS's regulation defining who is
"lawfully present" and whether the regulation survives that standard.
While HHS is part of the executive branch, under Wong, it does not
automatically receive the same deference given to Congress or the
President just because it is a federal agency. The amount of deference will
depend on whether HHS is regulating in its area of expertise and whether
it has an express mandate from Congress or the President to exclude
DACA recipients from the definition of "lawfully present." In addition,
there is a question about whether DACA recipients, who have only
deferred action status, are ever entitled to strict scrutiny, or if their status
automatically limits them to rational basis review. In the event that
rational basis review applies, is an interpretation of "lawfully present" that
treats people with the exact same status differently rational? Finally, since
the ACA does not require states to create their own Marketplaces, are they
engaging in prohibited discrimination by choosing to do so, or are they
merely following a federal direction? Each of these questions is discussed
below.
A. Does Heightened Scrutiny Apply?
1. Does HHS Lack Relevant Expertise?
In Mow Sun Wong, the Supreme Court indicated that its willingness to
give deferential review to a discriminatory rule made by a federal agency
depends on the institutional capacity of that agency. 266 While HHS plays a
role in immigration matters, that role is narrowly circumscribed to its

264. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2014).
265. Id. § 18081(a)(1). The nondelegation doctrine reached its peak during the New Deal era and
has fallen into desuetude since 1935. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine has become a
"nondoctrine"). Arguments for its revitalization include checking arbitray agency action and requiring
elected officials to make tough policy choices; see also, for example, J. Skelly Wright, Beyond
Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 584-86 (1972) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)). Arguments against renewal include that

it could lead to judicial activism or unpredictable policy results. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Returning
to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 352-53 (1987). Some commentators have proposed
revitalizing the doctrine in a limited way. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine:
Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1227 (1985) (proposing a model where
administrative, but not legislative, power would be delegable).
266. See Hartley, supra note 204, at 99-100; Motomura, supra note 187, at 211-12.
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health-related expertise. For example, HHS sets the requirements for the
medical examination of noncitizens seeking admission to the United States
and provides guidance on issues related to refugee health and
resettlement. 267 HHS does not, however, have direct responsibility over
immigration; like the Civil Service Commission in Wong, HHS is not
involved in foreign affairs, treaty negotiations, naturalization policies, or
establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry. In attempting to
define who is "lawfully present" in the country, HHS took on a task
outside its realm of expertise. This raises a serious question about whether
HHS's decision to define all individuals with deferred action status except
DACA recipients as "lawfully present" should receive the deference
normally given to the federal government when regulating immigration.
The question about the appropriate level of deference becomes
particularly salient when one takes into account that HHS's definition of
"lawfully present" departs from the interpretations of all other agencies,
including the Department of Homeland Security, which is the agency with
direct responsibility over immigration. In addressing eligibility to apply
for Title II Social Security benefits, DHS has defined "lawfully present" to
include all individuals with deferred action status. 268 Although DHS is
currently updating this regulation, it has not proposed any changes to its
definition of "lawfully
present," such as carving out an exception for
26 9
recipients.
DACA
The Department of Agriculture has followed DHS's lead and defined
"legally present" to have the same meaning that DHS gave "lawfully
present. " 27 It also explicitly adopted DHS's definition of "lawfully
present" in defining who is "lawfully residing in the U.S." for purposes of
the Food Stamp and Food Distribution Program. 27 1 Likewise, the
Department of Transportation adopted DHS's definition of "lawfully

267. See Medical Examination of Immigrants and Refugees, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/imniigrantrefugeehealth/exams/medical-examination.html (last visited
May 13, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/E9B6-RMEA; OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr (last visited May 13, 2016).

268. 8 C.F.R. § 103.12(a)(4)(vi) (2001) (including "[a]liens currently in deferred action status"
among the categories of noncitizens eligible for Title II Social Security benefits under Pub L. No. 104193); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (2016) (same).
269. See Immigration Benefits Business Transformation, Increment I, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,764, 53,780
(Aug. 29, 2011).
270. 7 C.F.R. § 2502.2 (2016) ("Legally present in the United States shall have the same meaning

as the term 'lawfully present' in the United States as defined at 8 CFR 103.12(a) ....
").
271. Id. § 273.4(a)(7) ("For purposes of determining eligible alien status in accordance with
paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(6)(ii)(I) of this section 'lawfully residing in the U.S.' means that the alien is
lawfully present as defined at 8 CFR 103.12(a).").
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present" in the regulations implementing the Uniform Act.272 The
Department of Housing and Urban Development incorporated the
Department of Transportation's definition
of "lawfully present," thereby
27 3
definition.
DHS's
adopting
also
In launching a new program in December 2014 that allows Central
American minors whose parents are "lawfully present" in the United
States to apply for refugee status in their home countries, the Department
of State defined "lawfully present" to include individuals with deferred
2 74
action status and explicitly included DACA recipients in this category.
Finally, at one point, DHS's own website informed DACA recipients:
"[Y]ou are considered to be lawfully present in the United States." 275 The
district court that issued a preliminary injunction to stop implementation
of the expanded DACA and DAPA policies pointed this out and
characterized the policies as forms of action rather than inaction because
they conferred this benefit of lawful presence. 276 HHS is currently the only
agency that has departed from DHS's expert interpretation of "lawfully
present," throwing its own interpretation of this term into question.
2. Was There an Express Mandatefrom Congress?
Under Mow Sun Wong, an executive agency that lacks immigration
expertise can still make alienage-based classifications if there is an express
mandate from Congress or the President. 2 77 Here, Congress could not
possibly have mandated the exclusion of DACA recipients from the ACA,
since DACA did not exist in 2010 when the ACA was enacted. The ACA
only mandates the exclusion of individuals who are not lawfully present; it
is silent 8about the categories of noncitizens who qualify as lawfully
27
present.

272. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 24.2(a)(2) (2016).
273. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 972.130(b)(5)(ii), 972.230(g)(5)(ii) (2016)

(referencing 49 C.F.R.

§ 24.208).
274. See Media Note, U.S. Dep't of State, Launch of In-Country Refugee/Parole Program for
Children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras with Parents Lawfully Present in the United States
(Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/12/234655.htm; see also U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, FoRM DS-7699: AFFIDAVIT OF RELATIONSHIP (AOR) FOR MINORS WHO ARE NATIONALS
OF EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND HONDURAS (2014).

275. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 660-61 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (issuing a temporary
injunction to stop the expanded DACA and DAPA policies from taking effect).
276. Id.
277. See supra notes 189, 195 and accompanying text.
278. See 42 U.S.C. § 18032(0(3) (2014).
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Furthermore, the Immigration and Nationality Act provides no basis for
the distinction drawn by HHS. The INA and its implementing regulations
make it clear that noncitizens are considered "unlawfully present" only if
their stay is not authorized by DHS.279 All individuals with deferred action
status are in a period of authorized stay. They therefore do not accrue
unlawful
and are eligible to apply for an employment
..
• ..presence
280
authorlzation.
Thus, HHS's interpretation of "lawful presence" conflicts
with Congress's use of the term in the INA.
In 2013, after HHS promulgated the regulation that excluded DACA
recipients from the ACA, the Senate expressed approval of the regulation
by incorporating its interpretation into the comprehensive immigration
reform bill it passed that year. Under the legalization program set forth in
that bill, noncitizens granted "registered provisional immigration status"
generally would have been considered lawfully present in the United
States, but they would have been subject to the rules applicable to
individuals not lawfully present under the ACA and would not have been
eligible for premium tax credits. 281 This post hoc approval of a regulation,
however, cannot be construed as an express mandate, which must
necessarily precede the rule. 2 82 Furthermore, Congress never passed the
comprehensive immigration reform
bill, so it should not be taken as
283
evidence of Congress's views.
3. Was There an Express Mandatefrom the President?

Since there was no express mandate from Congress, the next question
is whether there was an express mandate from the President to exclude
DACA recipients from benefits under the ACA. When President Obama
introduced DACA, he described it as a program that would help create a
more inclusive society, stressing that the beneficiaries of this program
"study in our schools,.., play in our neighborhoods, [are] friends with our

279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2014); 8 C.F.R. 214.14(d)(3) (2016); see also Frequently
Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/

consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions
(last updated
June 15, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/8E5Y-87QG [hereinafter USCIS FAQs].
280. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).
281. S.744, 113th Cong. §245B(d)(4)(A), (C) (2013).
282. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 947 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added)
("Where an agency fails to follow the PRA in regard to an information collection request that the
agency promulgates via regulation, at its own discretion, and without express prior mandate from
Congress, a citizen may indeed escape penalties for failing to comply with the agency's request.").
283. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) ("Though 'instructive,'
failure to act on the proposed bill is not conclusive of Congress' views ....
").
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kids, [and] pledge allegiance to our flag. ' 284 He described them as
"Americans
in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on
,,285
paper.
Excluding DACA recipients from the ACA while including
others with the same legal status is totally inconsistent with this vision of
inclusion. Such exclusion also conflicts with the President's focus on
helping a productive group of young people "make extraordinary
contributions" to society,6 since denial of affordable health care clearly
28
hampers productivity.
On the other hand, news reports indicate that the decision to exclude
DACA recipients from health care benefits under the ACA came from the
White House. 287 The reports characterized the White House's decision as
a political one, resulting from
the
collision of two highly controversial
••
. 288
issues: health care and immigration. Since conservative lawmakers had
adamantly opposed providing government health care to "illegal
immigrants," excluding DACA recipients, who were perceived as "illegal"
even after being granted deferred action289status, helped avoid another layer
of controversy over health care reform.
But can such reports be construed as an "express mandate" from the
President? Mow Sun Wong described an express mandate as an "explicit
directive" and found that the President's Executive Order giving the Civil
Service Commission discretion "to establish standards with respect to
citizenship" did not constitute such a mandate, as it was "not necessarily a
command to require
citizenship as a general condition of eligibility for
S .,,290
federal employment.
The Court further reasoned that there was no
express mandate from the President because the Commission could retain,
modify, or repeal the citizenship requirement "without further
authorization from Congress or the President." 29 1 The same situation
exists here with respect to HHS's exclusion of DACA recipients from the
ACA. The fact that HHS has already amended its interpretation of

284. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-imnigration.
285. Id.
286. Id.; see also generally PETER HARBAGE & BEN FURNAS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE COST
OF DOING NOTHING ON HEALTH CARE: LOST PRODUCTIVITY COSTS STATES $124 BILLION TO $248

BILLION (2009).
287. Shear & Pear, supra note 57 ("The White House decision to deny health benefits also
underscores how far the president's expected actions will fall short of providing the kind of full
membership in American society that activists have spent decades fighting for.").
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 111-12, 113 n.46 (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 113.
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"lawfully present" without explicit authorization from Congress or the
President indicates that it was not operating pursuant to an express
mandate.
4. Does Having Only DeferredAction Status Matter?
Even if HHS has no direct responsibility over immigration and there is
no express mandate from Congress or the President for the exclusion of
DREAMers from the ACA, the fact that DACA recipients have only
deferred action status gives rise to questions about whether any heightened
form of scrutiny is appropriate. As an initial matter, Plyler suggests that
undocumented immigrants receive only rational basis review, although the
Court applies rational basis with bite in that case. 292 Individuals with
deferred action status, however, can be distinguished from undocumented
immigrants because their presence in the United States is authorized by the
DHS, and they are eligible to work here legally. The fact that HHS
includes people with deferred action status as "lawfully present," even
though it carves out an exception for DACA recipients, shows recognition
that this status is different than being undocumented. Furthermore, before
the Welfare Reform Act became law in 1996, the definition of
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law"
("PRUCOL") included individuals with deferred action status, but not
undocumented immigrants. 2 93 Thus, a clear distinction exists between the
two categories.
Accepting that individuals with deferred action status are not
undocumented, there is still the question about whether non-LPRs should
receive heightened scrutiny. As discussed above, a circuit split exists on
this issue, with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits refusing to apply strict scrutiny
to state laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants. At least two reasons
weigh in favor of rejecting the positions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.
First, the language used by the Supreme Court does not support this
position. Graham broadly stated that "[afliens as a class are a prime
example of a 'discrete and insular'
S.,,294 minority for whom such heightened
appropniate.
is
solicitude
judicial
Furthermore, the factors on which the Fifth and Sixth Circuits relied
are not as clear-cut as those courts purported them to be. For example, the

292. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
293. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(b)(11) (2016).
294. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (emphasis added) (citing United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
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courts noted inability to serve in the military as one reason to treat
nonimmigrants differently than LPRs, 295 but a small number of
nonimmigrants-and, more recently, DACA recipients-can serve in the
military under the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest
("MAVNI") program, which targets individuals with special language
skills critical to national security. 296 The number of LPRs who serve in the
military is also relatively small, so service in the military does 297
not appear
to be a strong basis for treating LPRs and non-LPRs differently.
Similarly, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits' reliance on differential tax
treatment overlooks the overarching similarity in tax structures. Most
nonimmigrants are treated as "resident" aliens for tax purposes, just like
LPRs, as long as they spend at least thirty-one days in the United States in
the current year and at least 183 days in the period that includes the current
year and the prior two years. 298 Thus, a nonimmigrant who spends 183
days of the year in the United States is automatically a "resident" for tax
purposes and subject to the same tax rules that apply to LPRs and US
citizens. DACA recipients should qualify as "residents" for tax purposes
because they had to show continuous presence in the United States
between June 15, 2007, and June 15, 2012, and could not have left the
United States after that period without receiving advance parole. Advance
parole is normally granted only for short periods of time (e.g., thirty days)
for specific purposes and therefore should not interfere with satisfying the
substantial presence test. In addition, insofar as the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that nonimmigrants may be denied federal welfare benefits, 299 this does
not distinguish them from LPRs, who may also be denied such benefits. In
fact, individuals who have been
LPRs for less than five years are excluded
30 0
from most federal benefits.
Another reason to question the Fifth and Sixth Circuit's approach is
that several of the factors that led the courts to conclude that
nonimmigrants should receive only rational basis review do not point in
the same direction when applied to individuals with deferred action status.

295. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007);
LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418-19 (5th Cir. 2005).
296. Julia Preston, Military Path Opened for Young Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/us/military-path-opened-for-young-immigrants.html.
297.

See MOLLY F. MCINTOSH, SEEMA SAYALA & DAVID GREGORY, CNA, NON-CITIZENS IN THE

ENLISTED U.S. MILITARY 24 (2011).

298. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(A) (2014).
299. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
300.

See NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL

PROGRAMS 1-3 (2011).
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To begin with, individuals with deferred action status are often as
entrenched in US society as LPRs-especially DACA recipients, who
must show at least five years of residency and entry at a young age in
order to qualify. 3 0 1 Second, the fact that nonimnmigrants are subject to
strict employment restrictions is inapplicable to individuals with deferred
action status, who receive the type of employment authorization that
allows them to work at almost any job. Third, the argument that
nonimmigrants are not a discrete and insular class because they are
admitted with various types of status does not apply when focusing solely
on individuals with deferred action status.
Given the weaknesses in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit's reasoning, its
inapplicability to individuals with deferred action status, and the Supreme
Court's language pointing in the opposite direction, individuals with
deferred action status should not be denied heightened scrutiny merely
because of their status. More generally, although the notion of scaling
scrutiny to proximity to citizenship may seem attractive at first glance, it
opens the door to an array of problems. Trying to "rank" various types of
immigration status based on proximity to citizenship is harder than it may
seem because there is no clear hierarchy. It may be obvious that
undocumented
immigrants
are farther
from citizenship
than
nonimmigrants, who are farther than LPRs. But it is by no means clear
how one would compare someone with deferred action status to someone
who has only a pending application for asylum or who has Temporary
Protected Status.
Another issue is that the nature of a deprivation may be so severe that
closer scrutiny is warranted regardless of the legal status of the individual.
This was the case in Plyler, where the Court purported to apply rational
basis review but really applied heightened scrutiny. The sliding-scale
approach to scrutiny discussed in Part IV below allows courts to consider
these various factors without selecting a priori a particular tier for judicial
review.

301. For discussions of social membership and alienage, see, for example, Linda S. Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994);
David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and
Beyond, 1986 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 177; Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens
and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996).
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B. Does the Exclusion Survive Rational Basis Review?
Even if heightened scrutiny is not applied to the exclusion of DACA
recipients from the ACA, the exclusion may still be invalid under ordinary
rational basis review. The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Arizona
Dream Act Coalition is particularly relevant here. That case involved the
denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona's
policy of prohibiting DACA recipients from receiving driver's licenses by
using their work permits as proof of authorized presence, while permitting
individuals with pending applications for adjustment of status and
cancellation of removal to do so. 3 02 In reversing the denial of the
preliminary injunction and finding that the equal protection claim was
likely to succeed on the merits, the court held that DACA recipients are
similarly situated to individuals with pending applications, since both
groups have authorization to remain in the country for a temporary period
and are allowed to obtain work permits. 3 03 The court then reasoned that it
was not necessary to determine what standard of review applies, because
Arizona's "differential treatment of otherwise equivalent federal
immigration classifications" was so arbitrary and irrational as to be
304
unlikely to withstand even rational basis review.
HHS's differential treatment of DACA recipients is even more striking
because it distinguishes them from other individuals with the exact same
status, as well as from individuals with similar types of status. In order to
survive rational basis review, HHS's disparate treatment of DACA
recipients must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
30 5
Following the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Arizona Dream Act Coalition,
unless there is some basis in federal law for viewing non-DACA recipients
of deferred action status as having some federally authorized presence that
DACA recipients lack, the disparate treatment is not rational; no such
basis exists.
In fact, HHS's distinction between DACA recipients and other
individuals with deferred action status can lead to absurd results. For
example, many people obtain deferred action status after being ordered
deported and obtaining a temporary stay of removal. DACA recipients, on
the other hand, may never have been ordered deported. There is no rational
explanation for why someone with a stay of removal has more

302.
303.
304.
305.

Ariz. Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1066-67.
See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
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authorization to be in the United States than someone who was never
ordered deported in the first place. Furthermore, individuals who have
pending applications for non-LPR cancellation of removal are considered
"lawfully present" by HHS, even though this type of relief is very difficult
to obtain, since it requires showing "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" to a citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child. 306 It is odd to
consider these applicants lawfully present, when many of them will be
ordered deported, while excluding DACA recipients, whose deferred
action status may be extended for an indefinite period of time.
More generally, HHS's decision to exclude DACA recipients is not
rationally related to the objectives of the ACA, which is to increase the
number of insured individuals and reduce the cost of health care.
Excluding a class of young, generally healthy individuals from the
insurance programs established by the ACA drives up the cost of health
insurance premiums. In addition, when DACA recipients do seek
treatment, it will often be in emergency rooms, where the cost of care is
much more expensive. Providing DACA recipients with access to regular
health care, including preventive care, would avoid paying the higher cost
of treatment associated with delays in getting medical attention. Including
DACA recipients in the definition of "lawfully present" individuals would
also reduce the administrative costs of health care by making it easier to
determine who qualifies.
Under the current classification scheme, health care administrators will
have to determine how various individuals with deferred action obtained
this classification. In cases where individuals have work authorization, this
should not be too difficult, as the employment authorization card contains
a code that explains the category for work authorization, including a code
specific to DACA. Those who do not have employment authorization,
however, will have to provide evidence to administrators who have no
background in immigration law proving how they obtained their deferred
action status. According to one article, administrative costs in the US
health care system comprise fourteen percent of all health care
expenditures, totaling over $360 billion a year. 307 Simplifying eligibility
requirements would reduce documentation requirements and help cut
down this administrative cost. While DHS's Systematic Alien Verification
for Entitlements ("SAVE") program provides an online system to help
306.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2014).

307. ELIZABETH WIKLER, PETER BASCH & DAVID CUTLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS (2012).

3
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verify an individual's immigration30 status,
the accuracy and reliability of
8
that system has come under attack.
In sum, just as the court in Plyler found no evidence in the record to
support the claim that exclusion of undocumented children was likely to
improve the overall quality of education in Texas, 30 9 HHS would be hardpressed to show that excluding DACA recipients from affordable health
care will improve the overall quality of health care in the country.
Furthermore, even if health care would be improved by barring some
number of noncitizens from coverage, HHS would have to "support its
selection of this group as the appropriate target for exclusion," as it cannot
reduce expenditures for health care by barring "some arbitrarily chosen
class. ' 3 1° Finally, denial of health care, like the denial of a basic
education, is an "enduring disability, ' 3 11 making the analogy to Plyler
even more appropriate. Children without access to affordable health care
are less likely to obtain immunizations that prevent future illnesses and
receive timely diagnosis
312
.. of serious health conditions, and they miss more
days of school.
Similarly, uninsured adults are less likely to receive
preventive service and have higher rates of "unnecessary morbidity and
3 13
premature death.
C. Are States Engaging in ProhibitedDiscrimination?
The ACA establishes a complex relationship between the federal
government and state governments, as it gives states the option of running
their own state Marketplaces, sharing responsibilities with the federal
government in running Marketplaces, or refusing to get involved, which
means that the state would have a "Federally-facilitated [Marketplace] ,,314
For states that choose to run their own Marketplaces, either alone or in
partnership with the federal government, a question arises about whether
they are engaging in prohibited discrimination. As discussed above, courts
are currently divided about whether Congress can give discretion to the

308. See, e.g., Fatma Marouf, The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 66

(2012).
309. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
310. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633
(1969)).
311. Id. at222.
312. INST. OF MED., AMERICA'S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH
CARE, at 3 (2009).
313. Id. at4.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2016).
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states to engage in alienage-based discrimination under the Welfare
Reform Act, in light of Graham's warning that "Congress does not have
the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. " 3 15 Since administrative agencies are empowered to act by
enabling statutes, if Congress does not have the power to authorize
discrimination by States, then certainly an executive agency such as HHS
would not have the power to do so by adopting a discriminatory definition
of who is lawfully present.
As Judge Clifton explained in his dissent in Korab, the way Medicaid
actually works in most states is that "there is a single plan, administered
by the state. " 3 16 While "[t]he federal government reimburses the state for a
significant portion of the cost, and the,,317
plan must comply with federal
requirements .... it is a state plan.
Similarly, the state-based
Marketplaces under the ACA are state plans. According to the highest
courts of several states, and dissenting voices in the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, discrimination in such state plans must be subject to strict
scrutiny. 3 18 Since the ACA gives states an option about whether or not to
participate in a Marketplace, states have the option of not discriminating
against DACA recipients by not participating and leaving discrimination
to the federal government. The choice for a state about whether to provide
benefits to DACA recipients, like the choice about whether to provide
benefits to certain noncitizens under the Welfare Reform Act, arguably is
not a true choice if it means the state must engage in prohibited
discrimination. In other words, the same controversy that has emerged
under the Welfare Reform Act may arise under the ACA.
Currently, several states have chosen to provide DACA recipients with
insurance, such as Medicaid, using only state funds. These include
California, Massachusetts, New York, Washington, and the District of
Columbia. 319 Nothing in the ACA prohibits states from doing this, as the
statute does not address eligibility for state benefits. 32 DACA recipients

315. See supra Part II.C.
316. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 599 (9th Cir. 2014) (Clifton, J., dissenting).
317. Id.
318. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 598607 (9th Cir. 2014) (Clifton, J., dissenting); Soskin v.
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1265-76 (10th Cir. 2004) (Henry, J., dissenting); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908
A.2d 1220, 1243-44 (Md. 2006); Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., 946 N.E.2d
1262, 1279-80 (Mass. 2011); Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001).
319. See Cindy Y. Rodriguez & Jaqueline Hurtado, States Work Around Obamacare to Help
Undocumented Immigrants, CNN (Apr. 9, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/O4/O9/us/
obamacare-undocumented-immigrants/, archived at https://perma.cc/6W8L-KZTF.
320. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a)-(b), 1622(b) (2014).
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therefore remain eligible for state-funded programs that include people
with deferred action status among the categories of people "Permanently
Residing in the United States Under Color of Law." For example, DACA
recipients in California who meet the income criteria are eligible for fullscope Medi-Cal, which is totally state funded. 32 1 If, down the road, these
states change their minds about using state funds to provide health care to
DACA recipients, the result may be the same kind of litigation that
resulted when states stopped using their own funds to provide noncitizens
with Medicaid after the passage of the Welfare Reform Act.
IV. POSSIBLE PATHS THROUGH THE QUAGMIRE

A. Alternative Approaches to Judicial Scrutiny

There are at least two possible alternatives to the traditional tiered
approach to judicial scrutiny. One is a sliding-scale approach. Another is
to simply have a single standard. Justice Marshall argued long ago that
courts should abandon the tiered system and simply weigh "the character
of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in
the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do
not ..,receive,
and the asserted state interests in support of the
.. ,,322
classification.
Justice Stevens similarly expressed dissatisfaction with
a tiered approach, stating that "[t]here is only one Equal Protection
Clause," and it "does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review
in some cases and a different standard in other cases. ' 323 Many
commentators have agreed with
this perspective, critiquing the tiers and
324
proposing alternative models.

321. Letter from Cal. Health & Human Servs. Agency, Dep't of Health Care Servs., to All County
Welfare Directors & All County Medi-Cal Program Specialists/Liaisons (Aug. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Documents/MEDIL2014MEDIL14 -45.pdf.
322. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
323. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S 190, 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
324. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation,88 VA. L. REv. 951, 954 (2002)
(arguing that "existing accounts of equal protection leave the decision whether to treat a classification
as suspect-and most other decisions as well-to almost completely unguided normative judgment");
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S.CAL.L. REv. 481, 484 (2004) ("[T]he problems
with the three-tiered framework for judicial scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immediate consideration
of an alternative standard for review ....
");Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking
Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 65, 104 (2003) (noting that
Lawrence and Grutter "call into question the stability of' traditional equal protection standards of
review); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
945, 970 (2004) (expressing uncertainty about the utility of traditional equal protection classifications);
Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of
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Some of the main scholarly critiques of the tiered approach have been
that it leads the Court to manipulate principles and precedents in order to
reach the desired result in a particular case and creates inconsistency and
confusion when the Court deviates from the three established tiers.
In
addition, there is a sense of stagnation regarding the set of suspect
classifications, since courts have long been reluctant to recognize any new
classes. 326 The tiered approach also tends to miss what Professor Julie

Nice calls a "co-constitutive third strand" that examines the interaction
between rights and classes. 327 Plyler is an example of a case where the

Court found "neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class" but
nevertheless invalidated a discriminatory
law "because of the right's
32 8
importance to the targeted class."
As Justice Stevens recognized in Cleburne, the Supreme Court's cases

actually "reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing
3 29
classifications," rather than the tiered approach it purports to follow.
The use of "rational basis with bite" in Cleburne and Plyler are wellknown examples where the Court's analysis did not conform to the
traditional tiers. 330 Rather than characterizing the standard of review in
these cases as either heightened rational basis or intermediate scrutiny,

Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1430-35 (1995); Victor C. Romero, Equal
Protection Held Hostage: Ransoming the Constitutionality of the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L.

REV. 573 (1997); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of
Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 177-79 (1984); Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified:
Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L.

REV. 2339 (2006).
325. Shaman, supra note 324, at 177; see also Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 593 (9th Cir. 2014)
(Bybee, J., concurring) (stating that "the Court's indecision over the equal protection standard of
review gives these cases [involving alienage-based classifications] the appearance that the standard has
been manipulated to accommodate the Court's intuition over the result in the particular case").
326. Goldberg, supra note 324, at 581.
327. See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence:

Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature ofRights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1212.
328. Id. Nice articulates two major considerations that led to the results in these cases: "(1) how
the right (and particularly its denial) marks, defines, and constructs the meaning of the class; and (2)
how the class (and particularly its exclusion from enjoyment of the right) marks, defines, and
constructs the meaning of the right." Id. at 1225.
329. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
330. The majority and dissenting opinions in Plyler illustrate the difference between a uniform
and tiered approach. There, Justice Burger's dissenting opinion stuck to a strict, tiered mode of
analysis, reasoning that education was not a fundamental right and undocumented children were not a
suspect class, so rational basis review applied, and the Texas statute should have been upheld as
constitutional. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244-48 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan's majority opinion, on the other hand, recognized that more was involved than these "abstract
question[s]" and took into consideration how the deprivation of a basic education "imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status." Id. at 223.

1328

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

93:1271

courts could acknowledge that it departs from the tiered approach and
more closely resembles the sliding-scale approach originally proposed by
Justice Marshall.
In more recent years, the continuum in standards of review has become
only more visible. For instance, four of the most important gay rights
cases decided in the past two decades-Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and
Obergefell-invalidated discriminatory laws without ever addressing
whether gays and lesbians are a suspect class. 33 1 Consequently, Professor
William Araiza claims that the tiers are, for all practical purposes, already
dead. 332 Perhaps, as Professor Suzanne Goldberg has argued, the tiered
approach served its purpose "as an unwitting training vehicle for the
Court," and the Court has implicitly moved on. 3 33 Given the
inconsistencies that have developed in equal protection jurisprudence
involving alienage-based classifications, the time may be ripe for the
Court to explicitly embrace the sliding-scale approach that it is already
applying in practice. As discussed below, HHS's regulation should be
found unconstitutional under a sliding-scale approach, as well as under the
single standard
with three distinct inquiries proposed by Professor
33 4
Goldberg.
1. Applying a Sliding-ScaleApproach

Under the balancing test proposed by Justice Marshall, HHS's
regulation would not pass constitutional muster. Excluding DACA
recipients from affordable health insurance under the ACA deprives a

331. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597-2608 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendnent requires states to license marriages between two same-sex individuals and to recognize
such marriages lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state); United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct.
2675, 2684-96 (2013) (striking down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as violating the
equality principles of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
576-79 (2003) (striking down Texas's sodomy law as violating substantive due process); Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 580-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the result on an equal protection
ground); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-36 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2 to the Colorado
Constitution as violating the Equal Protection Clause). Justice Scalia, in his dissents, accused the Court
of applying an "unheard-of form of rational-basis review" in Lawrence and failing to employ "normal
'rational basis' analysis" in Romer. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer, 517 U.S.
at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
332. See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal

Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REv. 367, 369 (2014)
("[T]he Court has not performed a serious suspect class analysis-or purported to-in nearly thirty
years. To put that point in more personal terms, no current Justice was sitting the last time the Court
purported to engage in such an analysis.").
333. Goldberg, supra note 324, at 582.
334. See infra PartIV.A.1-2.
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discrete class of youth who are not culpable for their legal status of access
to health care, which the Supreme Court has recognized as "a basic
"335
necessity of life."
At the same time, it is not clear how giving coverage
to DACA recipients would harm the government. In fact, the opposite may
be true. Excluding a group that is younger and healthier than the general
population would increase health insurance premiums for everyone. The
ACA seeks to bring more people into the health insurance pool in order to
spread the risk for insurers and thereby reduce the costs of insurance.
Denying coverage to DACA recipients is antithetical to this objective. By
driving up premiums, the exclusion of DACA recipients may also lead to
more people choosing to remain uninsured and pay the penalty, thereby
further reducing the number of people in the insurance pool.
Furthermore, denying DACA recipients coverage under the ACA will
require them to rely more heavily on safety-net providers, which not only
shifts the cost of care to state and local governments, but also makes it
more expensive. 336 Not having a regular source of health care blocks
opportunities for preventive care, leading to costly
emergency room visits
337
and increasing overall future health care needs.
A third way that the exclusion of DACA recipients increases costs to
the government is by making the ACA harder to administer. State
agencies, eligibility workers, and patient navigators will all have to be
trained about the distinction between deferred action status granted
through DACA and through other means, and they will have to examine
more documents to determine the basis for the deferred action status. This
process not only is time-consuming for the administrators, but it will lead
to delays for consumers in accessing health care. Finally, denying
coverage to DACA recipients can increase costs for the government by
weakening efforts to fight communicable diseases in the general

335. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Roy G. Spece, Jr., Constitutional Attacks Against the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act's "'Mandating" That Certain Individuals and Employers Purchase Insurance
While Restricting Purchaseby UndocumentedImmigrants and Women Seeking Abortion Coverage, 38

N. KY. L. REv. 489, 543-44 (2011) (arguing that the right to purchase health insurance satisfies
numerous approaches relevant to identifying a fundamental right); Elizabeth R. Chesler, Note,
Denying Undocumented Immigrants Access to Medicaid:A Denial of Their Equal Protection Rights?,
17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 274-79 (2008) (arguing that infringements of the right to purchase health
care deserve heightened scrutiny).
336. Adrianne Ortega.... And Health Carefor All: Immigrants in the Shadow of the Promise of
Universal Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 195-98 (2009).
337. See SUSAN STARR SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: LIFE AND

DEATH IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY 12 (2005) ("Emergency room visits typically cost about four
times as much as treating the same problem in a regular office visit.").
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population. 33 8 Taking all of these factors into consideration, a sliding-scale
approach to judicial scrutiny indicates that the exclusion of DACA
recipients from access to health care under the ACA violates equal
protection.
The Court has explicitly embraced a sliding-scale formulation of
scrutiny in other contexts and could do so in the equal protection context
as well. For example, in voting rights cases that implicate both the
fundamental right to vote and the government's interest in structuring
elections, the Supreme Court has "avoided preset levels of scrutiny in
favor of a sliding-scale balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies with the
effect of the regulation at issue."33 9 In First Amendment cases, the Court
has also applied a sliding-scale approach in certain contexts instead 34of
0
simply categorizing speech as either protected or unprotected.
Furthermore, in the evolving jurisprudence on the right to bear arms under
the Second Amendment, federal appellate courts "have grappled with
varying sliding-scale and tiered-scrutiny approaches, agreeing as a general
matter that the level of scrutiny applied to gun control regulations depends
on the regulation's burden on the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms." 34 1 As one federal appellate judge noted in discussing different
forms of strict and intermediate scrutiny, "How strong the government
interest must be, how directly the law must advance that interest, how
reasonable the alternatives must be-those questions are not always
framed with precision in two clearly delineated categories, as opposed to
S,,342
points on a sliding scale of heightened scrutiny approaches.
If a sliding
scale works for analyzing other constitutional issues, it can also be utilized
in the equal protection context.

338. See, e.g.,

SHAWN FREMSTAD & LAURA Cox, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID

& THE

UNINSURED,

KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COVERING NEW AMERICANS: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND
STATE POLICIES RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS' ELIGIBILITY AND ACCESS TO PUBLICLY FUNDED HEALTH

INSURANCE 15 (2004); Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The AntiImmigrant Provisions of the "Contract with America" Congress, 90 Ky. L.J. 1043, 1044 (2002);
Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on UndocumentedImmigrants'Access to Health Services: The Public
Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1630, 1632 (2003).

339. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008).
340. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the court must strike "a
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public

concern [against] the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees").
341. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nordyke v. King,
681 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
342. Heller v. Dist. of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1277 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting).
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2. Answering Goldberg's Three Questions

Professor Suzanne Goldberg proposes a different model than a
balancing test to replace the tiered framework. Distilling the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence, she proposes a single standard
consisting of three distinct inquiries to determine whether a classification
is unconstitutional:
(1) whether a plausible, nonarbitrary explanation exists for why the
burdened group has been selected to bear the challenged burden in
the context at issue;
(2) whether the justification offered for the line drawing has a
specific relationship to the classification's context; and
(3) whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike,343or
stereotyping of the class of persons burdened by the legislation.
If any of these inquiries is not satisfied, then the classification would be
invalid. 34 4 Under this model, too, HHS's regulation would be
unconstitutional.
Professor Goldberg explains that the first question, which she calls the
"intracontextual inquiry," "demands that a plausible explanation exist for
why a group has been singled out for burdensome treatment in a particular
context.
As noted above, Plyler emphasized this issue in stating that
,even if improvement in the quality of education were a likely result of
barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the State
must support
, • ,,346 its selection of this group as the appropriate target for
exclusion.
Applying this prong of the analysis to the exclusion of
DREAMers from affordable health insurance under the ACA, there is no
obvious reason why HHS singled out DREAMers for exclusion from the
ACA. HHS's explanation that DREAMers should be excluded because
giving them health care was not part of the DACA program makes little
sense since the same could be said for any other group of individuals with
deferred action status. For example, HHS could have just as easily singled
out individuals with prior orders of removal who have been granted
deferred action status on the basis that DHS never intended them to get
access to health care when it approved them for deferred action status.

343.
344.
345.
346.

Goldberg, supra note 324, at 533.
Id.
Id. at 534.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982); see also supra note 310 and accompanying text.
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The second question proposed by Goldberg is an "extracontextual
inquiry" that asks whether the justification for the classification is so broad
that it "could be invoked to justify burdening a trait in all settings,
effectively allowing for the creation of superior and inferior classes."
Treating DACA recipients as inherently different from other noncitizens
with deferred action status fails this test as well. If DACA recipients can
be singled out as not "lawfully present" for purposes of coverage under the
ACA, then what would prevent the government from singling them out for
denial of other benefits available to individuals with deferred action status
as well? By signaling that DACA recipients are less deserving of benefits
than others with the exact same status, HHS opens the door to
discriminating against DREAMers in all different settings.
The third question is the "bias inquiry" and asks whether the
government action gives effect to prejudice and stereotyping. 34 8 In
Cleburne, Romer, and Moreno, for example, the Court applied heightened
scrutiny after detecting impermissible animus against
S,349 individuals with
intellectual disabilities, gays, and hippies, respectively.
The bias inquiry
does not, however, require evidence of overtly hostile purposes. Goldberg
explains that "serious defects in the process that led to the classification's
adoption" are also relevant to this inquiry.3 50 With respect to HHS's
regulation, there may not be evidence of animus by HHS towards
DREAMers. As explained above, the decision to exclude them from the
ACA appears to have been a political compromise to appease conservative
legislators who adamantly opposed giving health care to "illegal
immigrants." Certainly, some of those legislators harbor animus against
DREAMers, along with other immigrants who did not enter the country
lawfully or fell out of status. Congressman Steve King (R-IA) expressed
such animus in July 2013, when he told the media: "For everyone [sic]
who's a valedictorian, there's another 100 out there who weigh 130
pounds-and they've got calves the size of cantaloupes because they're
35 1
hauling 75 pounds of marijuana across the desert."

347. Goldberg, supra note 324, at 544.

348. Id. at 544-45.
349. Id. at 545-47 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
350. Id. at 548.
351. Todd Beamon & John Bachman, Rep. Steve King Slams Norquist over Attacks on
Immigration, NEWSMAX (July 18, 2013, 5:59 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/king%C2%
ADnorquist%C2%ADattacks%C2%ADimmigration2013/07/18/id/515882/, archived at https://perina.cc/
3K5E-Y8Y7.
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Even assuming no overt hostility behind HHS's regulation, the defects
in the process through which it was adopted make it vulnerable to attack
under the bias inquiry. The fact that HHS skipped over regular notice and
comment procedures, as well as the normal thirty-day waiting period
before a rule becomes effective, raises serious procedural concerns.
Although HHS relied on the good cause exception to justify these actions,
the case law indicates that the exception may have been improperly
invoked, as discussed further in Subpart IV.B below. In sum, HHS's
regulation clearly flunks the first inquiry, likely fails the second one, and
may also flunk the third inquiry. Since the failure to satisfy any one of
these inquiries means the government action is unconstitutional under
Goldberg's proposal, HHS's regulation would not survive this equal
protection analysis, just as it would not survive a sliding-scale balancing
test.
B. Avoiding Equal ProtectionAnalysis Altogether

Another possible approach would be to just avoid equal protection
analysis and resolve the case under other legal doctrine. For example,
HHS's regulation could be challenged under the Administrative Procedure
Act or under Chevron. After briefly discussing these alternative
approaches, this Subpart explains why it is nevertheless important to
resolve the riddle of alienage-based classifications in equal protection law.
1. ChallengingHHS's Regulation Under the APA

HHS's regulation could be challenged as improperly promulgated
under the APA. As mentioned above, HHS issued the regulation without
notice and comment based on the "good cause" exception. Under this
exception, an agency may forego notice and comment when it finds that
following these procedures is "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest. ' 352 HHS found that it would be "contrary to the public
interest" to go through notice and comment because the temporary
insurance program had already started enrolling eligible individuals and
had limited funding. 35 3 In addition, HHS characterized
DACA recipients
35 4
as a "new and unforeseen group" of applicants.

352. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2014).
353. Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,614, 52,616 (Aug. 30,
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 152).
354. Id.
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These reasons are unlikely to satisfy the good cause exception, which
must be "narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced." 355 The
DC Circuit has explained that "[t]he public interest prong of the good
cause exception is met only in the rare circumstance when ordinary
procedures-generally presumed to serve the public interest-would in
fact harm that interest. ' 356 Furthermore, all of the same factors that HHS
used to justify the exception-active enrollment, the temporary nature of
the program, and limited funding-were present in 2010 when HHS
initially defined "lawfully present" to include everyone with deferred
action status.
It could also be argued that HHS had adequate time to go through
notice and comment procedures. If HHS had promptly published a
proposed change to the definition of "lawfully present" after the DACA
program was announced on June 15, 2012, then the normal notice and
comment process could have been completed before any DACA
applications were approved. 357 Finally, many circuits have held that an
agency must go through notice and comment when promulgating a rule
that represents a significant shift in regulatory direction. Under the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, "[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an
interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally
modify theS,358
regulation itself: through...
the process of notice and comment
rulemaking.
The Supreme Court is currently reviewing this doctrine in
a pending case, and its decision may prove relevant to determining
359
whether HHS complied with the APA's requirements.
2. ChallengingHHS's Regulation Under Chevron
Another approach is to challenge HHS's regulation interpreting
"lawfully present" to exclude DACA recipients as an invalid interpretation

355. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Util. Solid Waste
Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
356. Id. at 95; see also Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp., 236 F.3d at 754 (quoting Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (stating that the exception "'should be
limited to emergency situations"').
357. See Julia Preston, U.S. Says FastPace Continues on Reprieves for Young Immigrants, N.Y.

TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/us/us-cites-fast-pace-on-reprieves-foryoung-illegal-immigrants.html? r=0 (stating that DHS had approved twenty-nine DACA applicants by
September 14, 2012).
358. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
abrogatedby Perez v.Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
359. Perez, 135 S.Ct. 1199.

2016]

ALENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS

1335

of the statute under Chevron.36 The first step of Chevron requires courts
to ask whether Congress has spoken directly on the issue.36 1 In other
words, has Congress explicitly addressed whether DACA recipients
should be considered "lawfully present" in the United States, such that the
ACA would apply to them? In answering this question, courts would look
at the plain languae of the ACA, as well as its object and purpose and its
legislative history.362 Here, neither the text of the ACA nor its legislative
history address this issue, since DACA did not exist when Congress
passed the ACA. One argument that could be made under the first step of
Chevron is that excluding DACA recipients undercuts the object and
purpose of the ACA, as discussed above. Another argument is that
Congress's statutory directive to HHS was to define the categories of
"lawfully present" individuals. The plain language of the statute therefore
indicates that Congress left it to HHS to determine which types of status
qualify as lawful presence under the ACA. But nothing in the statute
indicates congressional permission to classify aliens based on how they
obtained their status.
Assuming that Congress did not speak directly to the issue, the next
3 63
question under Chevron is whether HHS's interpretation is reasonable.
HHS's interpretation is seriously vulnerable under this second prong.
Courts are reluctant to show •deference
to
.. .
364an agency interpretation that is
inconsistent with prior interpretations.
Here, HHS recognized that
deferred action status constitutes "lawful presence" but then changed its
mind and decided that DACA recipients with this status are not "lawfully
present." Furthermore, HHS's interpretation of "lawfully present" in the
ACA is inconsistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act and its
implementing regulations, which make it clear that noncitizens are
considered "unlawfully present" only if their stay is not authorized by
DHS. 365 All individuals with deferred action status are in a period of
366
authorized stay under the INA.
Although HHS is interpreting the ACA and not the INA, the Supreme
Court has held that there is a presumption that Congress uses the same

360. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
361. Id. at 842-43.
362. E.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000).
363. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
364. E.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012).
365. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3) (2016); see also USCIS
FAQs, supra note 279.
366. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).
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term consistently in different statutes. 367 Moreover, the Court has held that
a single, undifferentiated term .in .a 368
statute must be given the same meaning
in all of its potential applications.
The Court observed that giving the
same term different meanings "would be to invent a statute rather than
interpret one." 369 Even if a statutory term is ambiguous, the Court
explained, that does not justify two different simultaneous constructions of
the same phrase depending on the category of aliens to which the phrase is
applied. 37 The Court noted that a contrary holding would establish a
"dangerous principle" that the same text could be given "different
,371
meanings in different cases."
Here, "lawfully present" is a single term, yet HHS has given it two
different interpretations when applied to two different groups: for DACA
recipients, deferred action status does not constitute lawful presence, but
for everyone else, it does. 372 This construction is impossible to square with

367. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (stressing the "premise that when
Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is
enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the
same meaning in both statutes"); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 254 (1994)
(displaying similar reasoning); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that to overcome the presumption that the same term had the same meaning in different
statutes, the Department of Commerce was required to provide reasonable explanation); cf. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85-86 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) ("[W]hen judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate
its ... judicial interpretations as well."). But see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (warning that courts "must be careful not to apply rules
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination"); Atl.
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) ("Where the subject-matter to
which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used, or the conditions are
different, or the scope of the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that exercised in
another, the meaning well may vary to meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a consideration
of the language in which those purposes are expressed, and of the circumstances under which the
language was employed."); Global Computer Enters. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 350, 410 (2009)
("[A]bsent congressional intent to the contrary, the same term need not have the same definition in two
wholly distinct statutes ....").
368. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).
369. Id.
370. See id.
371. Id. at 386; see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329 (2000) ("[W]e refuse
to adopt a construction that would attribute different meanings to the same phrase in the same
sentence, depending on which object it is modifying.").
372. The term "deferred action" appears at various places in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i) (2014) (describing certain categories of noncitizens eligible for
deferred action and work authorization); id. § 1227(d)(2) ("The denial of a request for an
administrative stay of removal under this subsection shall not preclude the alien from applying for a
stay of removal, deferred action, or a continuance or abeyance of removal proceedings under any other
provision of the immigration laws of the United States.").
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the statute under the Supreme Court precedents discussed above. The
doctrine of constitutional avoidance lends additional support to the
argument that "lawfully present" cannot be construed to include
individuals with deferred action status but to exclude DREAMers. Under
this doctrine, if a statute is ambiguous but one interpretation "would raise
serious constitutional problems," that interpretation is not given any
deference. 373 For all of the reasons discussed in Part III above, HHS's
interpretation raises a serious equal protection issue. The traditional tools
of statutory interpretation therefore indicate that HHS's interpretation is
unreasonable and would not survive step two of Chevron.
Indeed, HHS's lack of expertise in the area of immigration and the
significant economic and political issues at stake in determining which
categories of noncitizens qualify for health insurance suggest that Chevron
deference may not even apply. As noted above, in King v. Burwell, the
Supreme Court did not apply Chevron in a case challenging an IRS
regulation interpreting the ACA's tax credit provisions. 374 Instead, it
simply decided to interpret the ACA itself, noting the IRS's lack of
expertise in crafting health insurance policy and the deep economic and
political significance of the question regarding whether tax credits are
available on federal Exchanges. 375 It is also unclear whether HHS
consulted with DHS about how to define "lawfully present." Lack of
expertise combined with failure to engage in such
consultation would
376
temper any deference given to HHS's interpretation.
3. Why Equal Protection Still Matters
Even if multiple ways exist to analyze a legal issue involving alienagebased classifications, there are important reasons not to ignore the equal
protection problem. First, in some cases, the equal protection issue may be
determinative of the outcome. For example, in Korab, where the Ninth
Circuit upheld Hawaii's law excluding certain nonimmigrants from health
benefits, Judge Bybee's concurrence noted that "[t]he choice between a
pure preemption analysis and a pure equal protection analysis yields very
different results. ' 377 Furthermore, if courts decide to bypass challenging

373. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988).
374. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
376. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006).
377. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 596 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring).
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equal protection issues, the legal standards will never be clarified,
reinforcing the current conundrum surrounding alienage classifications. In
highlighting the tensions in every area-from federal authority to state
authority to hybrid statutes-this Article underscores the urgency for legal
reform. It is difficult to understand how the standard of review for a
classification that has been recognized as a suspect class for over forty
years remains in such a state of disarray. If federal appellate judges
describe the law as "unsustainable" and a "morass of conflicting
approaches," 3 78 then the time has come for simplification and change.
Clarifying the treatment of alienage-based classification is also critical
because of the role that equal protection principles have played in
groundbreaking social changes during the past century, including the end
of egregious forms of discrimination based on race, sex, and sexual
orientation. Equal protection analysis plays a unique and distinct role
specific to preventing arbitrary discrimination that cannot be replaced by
preemption analysis, the APA, Chevron, or other doctrines. Moreover,
unlike many other legal concepts, equal protection principles have the
special ability to evolve over time. We are now at a historical moment
where perceptions of prejudice based on alienage are shifting, but the
government still maintains that discrimination,
overt racial
• • even
•
379
discrimination, is permissible in the arena of immigration.
Clarifying
the equal protection jurisprudence in this area is therefore essential to
protecting against invidious discrimination.
CONCLUSION

In the thirty-three years since Plyler was decided, tremendous changes
have taken place in immigration law. Many of the children who were
undocumented at that time are now US citizens due to the legalization
program that was part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986. Similarly, if some type of legalization program is passed in the
future, today's DACA recipients will become tomorrow's citizens.

378. Id. at 584, 598. Judge Bybee favored a preemption analysis, which Hawaii's law would
survive, over an equal protection analysis, which he thought Hawaii's law would likely fail, due to the
"unsustainable" state of the law regarding alienage-based classifications. Id. at 593-98.
379. For example, in a recent case argued before the Supreme Court about whether consular
denials of visas are subject to any kind of judicial review, one of the questions asked by Justice Breyer
during oral argument was whether a consular official could deny a visa for racially discriminatory
reasons, to which the government answered in the affirmative. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1213, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral arguments/argument transcripts/13-1402 la7d.pdf.
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Denying them health care means that the government will incur far greater
health care costs down the road for conditions that could have been
prevented or treated much more easily earlier on. Furthermore, for the
DACA recipients themselves, delayed care may cause irreversible harm.
Singling out this subgroup of individuals with deferred action status,
who are the least culpable for their current status, for exclusion from
affordable health coverage makes no legal or moral sense. Either deferred
action status constitutes lawful presence in the United States or it does not,
but to say some individuals with this status are lawfully present while
others are not is totally arbitrary and opens the door to other kinds of
discrimination against politically unpopular groups. Such arbitrary
discrimination demands scrutiny under equal protection principles. Yet
those principles are currently in a state of chaos.
Confusion and conflict exist regarding alienage-based classifications
made by both the federal and state governments, as well as in hybrid
situations. The lack of clarity in these areas makes it challenging to
analyze the exclusion of DACA recipients by HHS, a federal agency that
lacks immigration expertise. Nevertheless, heightened scrutiny is
appropriate. Even under rational basis review, however, the regulation
excluding DACA recipients from the definition of "lawfully present"
should not survive. Acknowledging that the Court no longer actually
follows a tiered approach and explicitly embracing a more flexible sliding
scale would make the analysis much more straightforward and better
reflect the Constitution's equal protection values. While we may be blind
to the injustices of our own times, we need not turn a blind eye to the
disintegration of the tiered framework that was designed to address such
injustice.

